


# LEIPZIG
# THE BATTLE OF THE NATIONS

## A WARGAMER'S GUIDE TO THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 1813

ROHAN SARAVANAMUTTU


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
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# LEIPZIG, THE BATTLE OF THE NATIONS

## A Guide to Wargaming the Battle of Leipzig 1813

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Prussian Foot Guards. (Mark Freeth, The Wargames Holiday Centre)

# Introduction

The Battle of Leipzig was the biggest battle of the Napoleonic wars, involving over 500,000 men. Until the First World War, it was the biggest battle ever fought on European soil. It was also known as the Battle of the Nations because it pitted the forces of France and its satellite states and allies (including Italians, Poles and forces from the minor German states), against those of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. The fate of Europe hung in the balance. Napoleon's defeat decided the outcome of the campaign of 1813 and pushed the French back to France.

The battle took place over several days (14–19 October 1813) and naturally breaks down into several distinct phases and sectors. This guide aims to help wargamers refight the battle on the tabletop with model soldiers, either as one large battle (suitable perhaps as a club game or for someone with a large table at home), or broken down into a series of smaller battles covering the different sectors. The smaller battles can be played as individual games or linked together in a minicampaign, the latter giving strategic dilemmas for each of the commanders to resolve.

The guide sets out the strategic situation in central Europe and contains a thorough but clear account of the historical battle. It provides detailed orders of battle of the opposing armies, scaled down orders of battle for game purposes, maps of the historical events, stylised maps for laying out a wargames table and instructions for playing each scenario and the mini campaign. The

Design Note section explains the rationale and historical background to the scenarios.

The scenario maps are set out on square grids for ease of setting up tabletop terrain. Any set of wargame rules for the period can be used to play the scenarios. The key points for the game army lists are the number of units and their quality. There is a section that discusses the quality of the troops of the various nations involved.

Any discussion on the historical battle raises questions about the decisions made by the actual commanders. These can be explored by the wargame commanders; for example by their allocation of forces to different sectors (within historical constraints), their deployment within those sectors, or the timing and use of their reserves. Was Napoleon's defeat inevitable? Wargaming is a form of counter-factual history and the guide includes a variation which may answer the question, 'What if Napoleon had recalled the Dresden garrison?'. Napoleon had agreed with Marshal St. Cyr that it would be madness to leave his 50,000 men in Dresden rather than concentrate French forces for the decisive battle Napoleon was seeking. What if Napoleon had not changed his mind?

[Map 1: German theatre of operations.]

# Part I

# 1

# The Historical Background

---

## Strategic Situation in Central Europe

So far, the 1813 campaign in Germany had proved indecisive. Napoleon had won victories at Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden, while his marshals had suffered defeats at Gross-Beeren, the Katzbach and Kulm.

In late September 1813 Napoleon's main force occupied a central position in Saxony, mainly near Leipzig, while the Allies had been operating several armies, with the policy of evading battle with Napoleon but engaging his marshals. Until 25 September, the Army of Bohemia under Prince Schwarzenberg, operating out of Bohemia, had been jabbing northwards at Dresden. The Army of Silesia under Prince Blucher was nearby. The Army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden (Marshal Bernadotte) had been operating in the area south of Berlin and the Russian Army of Poland under General Bennigsen was on its way from Poland. On 25 September, the Army

of Silesia was detached to go north to join Bernadotte and the Army of Bohemia abandoned its attacks on Dresden to move west towards Leipzig, leaving a small force covering Dresden. In the words of David Chandler ‘In this decision lay the seeds of the great Battle of the Nations’.[1]

By 3 October Blucher had reached Wartenburg on the Elbe, close enough to cooperate with Bernadotte who was at Rosslau further up the Elbe. On 9 October Napoleon thrust north but Blucher evaded him. Blucher’s rearguard division was decimated near Duben but did enough to cover his movements. Instead of retreating north, Blucher marched west to Halle on the River Saale. At this point Bernadotte wanted to retreat back over the Elbe but Blucher refused to comply and marched his army alone towards Leipzig to join with the Army of Bohemia. Bernadotte reluctantly followed.

Although unsure of Blucher’s exact position, Napoleon realised that the Allies were closing in on Leipzig and he drew in his forces to concentrate there.

At the time of the battle, the French were still holding Dresden (about 70 miles to the east) with approximately 51,000 men in two corps (I and XIV) under Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr (Appendix IV). Napoleon had met St. Cyr on 6 October and agreed that it would be madness to leave a garrison in Dresden when it was vital to concentrate all his troops for the decisive battle he was seeking.[2] Napoleon then quickly changed his mind, considering Dresden to be of vital importance. It was a supply depot (on 10 September he had ordered a vast quantity of flour to be transported by barge upstream on the Elbe from Torgau to Dresden),[3] it was the centre of a road network and crossing point over the River Elbe and it was politically important as the capital of Saxony. If he lost Dresden, his Saxon Allies might defect as the

Bavarians had recently done, although this risk was mitigated by the King of Saxony currently being in Leipzig surrounded by Frenchmen. Holding Dresden also gave Napoleon the option of launching an offensive into Bohemia once the Army of the North was dealt with.

In addition to the Dresden force, Napoleon had about 50,000 troops garrisoning various fortresses that covered important crossing points over the rivers Elbe, Oder and as far as the Vistula. These included the X Corps under Rapp at Danzig. They were all blockaded by the Allies. The fortress of Thorn, on the Vistula, had already fallen to the Allies in the spring.

Davout was in the Hamburg area commanding an army of about 45,000 men, made up of XIII Corps, a Danish Corps and the Hamburg garrison.[4] These were facing an allied force under the Russian General Wallmoden, based at Schwerin, consisting of about 30,000 Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Mecklenburgers and Hanoverians, plus Landsturm (militia used as garrisons and guerrillas).

Napoleon’s objective at this point in the campaign was to defeat the Allies and then recover Northern Germany, relieving the fortresses. If he could take Berlin, he might knock Prussia out of the war. The consequences of losing the battle of Leipzig can be seen by what actually happened: St. Cyr became blockaded and surrendered at Dresden a few weeks later. Some of the fortress garrisons also surrendered while others held out until the end of the war in 1814 but remained cut off. The remainder of Napoleon’s German Allies defected to the Allies.

## The Quality of the Armies

It is often said that after suffering catastrophic losses in Russia in 1812, Napoleon's army of 1813 included many newly raised, young conscripts and was short of cavalry. Napoleon actually had about 39,000 cavalry at the battle of Leipzig, which is no small number. However, the Allies had more and together with the Cossacks, denied Napoleon cavalry superiority, thus constraining his reconnaissance activities. Furthermore, many French horses were young conscripts – four-year-olds– lacking the stamina of their elders. To recognise this fact the game order of battle classifies some newly raised line dragoons as militia. Conversely, Milhaud's Sixth Heavy Cavalry Division (part of Pajol's V Cavalry Corps) were newly arrived from Spain and were well mounted on Andalusian horses.[5]

By this stage of the campaign many of the French had undertaken a lot of marching and had spent time on half rations which must have affected their morale.[6] Most of them had also acquired some battle experience, so the conscripts were not completely raw, although some were newly arrived. Of the infantry, Chandler describes Marmont's corps as being probably the best in the army, consisting mainly of veteran battalions, but even these contained many new recruits. Marmont's corps had fought at the battles of Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden, so even the new recruits were now well blooded. His corps included 15 infantry battalions drawn from the marine artillery. Incidentally, the French Marin is sometimes mistakenly translated as the English 'marine' (a seaborne infantryman) rather than sailor. Marmont's Marins had not previously had any infantry experience but were described by him as magnificent.[7] Lagrange's division of Marmont's corps never went to Russia, so would have escaped the catastrophic losses of 1812.

The wargame also gives Napoleon's Polish troops a high morale class (veteran) because they fought with uncommon tenacity. No doubt they were aware that Prussia and Austria wanted to carve up the Duchy of Warsaw. The Czar was quite happy for there to be a separate Kingdom of Poland, provided that he was the King! The Poles had a particular enmity for the Russians and earlier in the campaign there had been instances of Poles in Austrian service defecting to the French, evidencing Polish nationalism. On the other hand, several battalions of Poles joined the Allies after the battle,[8] which may have been preferable to captivity.

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There were more defections to the Allies, for example when Cossacks raided Westphalia in late September, some Westphalians defected and were formed into a squadron of a Landwehr cavalry regiment.[9] The Kingdom of Bavaria officially defected on 8 October, losing Napoleon a division and shaking the foundations of the Confederation of the Rhine – most of the Saxons defected during the battle on 18 October and also some Württemberg cavalry with them. In the wargame there is a risk of any German troops in French service defecting.

Petre describes three of the four Young Guard divisions as being conscripts, 'Differing in no respect from those who formed regiments of the line'.[10] At least 12 battalions (equivalent to one division) were veterans of the war in Spain and elsewhere, having avoided the Russian campaign.[11] Therefore the game order of battle only has a minority of the Young Guard classed as elite.

The French officers from battalion commanders upwards were good, experienced men, while the junior offices were either young or newly promoted NCOs.

The allied army also contained many inexperienced troops. Austria's large army had largely been disbanded after its defeat in 1809 because of the financial constraints imposed by the cost of the war, payment of reparations to the French and an inflation crisis in 1811 –

thus many of its troops of 1813 were newly raised. Furthermore, Austria did not join the coalition until 12 August and so did not gain the experience of the battles of Spring 1813, such as Lützen and Bautzen.

Austria, along with all the Allies, received financial support from Britain in 1813. As the great naval historian Alfred T. Mahan colourfully put it, Britain was ‘The fruitful mother of subsidies upon whose breasts hung the impoverished and struggling nations of the continent’.[12] In addition to money, Britain provided a million muskets to the Allies in 1813.[13]

General Sir Charles Stewart (later to become Lord Charles Vane, Marquess of Londonderry), who, as Britain's Minister Plenipotentiary to Prussia, was attached to the allied forces in Northern Germany, reported his assessment of the allied troops. Earlier in the year he had described the Russian army as being, 'somewhat in decline … The battalions seldom exceed 250–300 men',[14] having suffered severely in 1812. However, the cavalry was good: 'The horses, subsisting in a country abounding with forage, were in good condition', although the Cossacks were, 'Not formidable when a bold enemy advances'. The Russians made good use of the time during the armistice in the summer to improve the state of their army. Most of the newly raised reserve units arriving from Russia were broken up and distributed around the army to bring battalions up to strength; scattered formations were brought back together and first and second battalions were reunited. The infantry had previously suffered ammunition supply problems caused by having many different types of muskets with different calibres within a battalion. During the summer lull, they tried to swap weapons between units to create more uniformity. Colonel Rudolf von Friederich, Head of the Historical Section of the Prussian General Staff, commented that the Russian reserves arriving during the armistice were well equipped and trained and superior to the Prussian and Austrian reinforcements joining their armies. They had suffered a high attrition rate during the epic march from Russia, although most of those who dropped out eventually caught up. Those that made it were toughened up by the march and continued their training after arrival, including shooting practice.[15] The Russians however suffered a scarcity of lead and therefore their training was generally limited to shooting six rounds of live ammunition per year, otherwise they had to train with clay bullets. This compares unfavourably with the 30 rounds allocated to British line infantry and the 50 rounds for British light infantry.[16]

Bennigsen's Russian Army of Poland was largely a reserve army of new recruits, although its cavalry contained cadres of veterans. It had been relieved from duties in Poland by the arrival of a new reserve army (in training) under Prince Lobanov. Bennigsen started with a substantial number of militia units, but they were not present at Leipzig and must have been detached to blockade French-held fortresses.

The size of the Prussian army had been restricted by treaty after its defeat in 1807, although this was mitigated by training troops in rotation and placing them in the Reserve. General Stewart reported that the Prussian soldiers were animated with a fighting spirit, 'Their state of discipline was good and their superior officers most efficient, their cavalry fine and artillery excellent'.[17]

Stewart had reviewed the Swedish contingent on 5 August. He was not impressed with the infantry but their later performance in the field exceeded his anticipations. Their guns were of iron, 'and seemed to be particularly inefficient' and their equipment not as good as other armies. His view was that the Swedish cavalry was poor because their mounts were not good cavalry horses and they lacked training in large manoeuvres: 'few regiments of cavalry in Sweden are ever kept together'.[18] For these reasons, the game order of battle downgrades the Swedish artillery and the heavy cavalry of the line to militia status.

During the battle, Stewart persuaded Blucher to give him command of the Brandenburg Hussars, who successfully charged a battery of French artillery, capturing eight guns,[19] thus the game order of battle

has the novelty of a Prussian regiment having a British staff officer in command.

The British general, Sir Robert Wilson, who was attached to the Army of Bohemia, considered that, ‘In the Russian army there was a want of zeal to continue the war’.[20] Their experiences of 1812 had left them more war weary than their allies.

French cuirassiers with Saxon light cavalry in support. (Chris Robinson)




[Map 2: The Leipzig Region]

[Map 3: The Historical Battlefield of Leipzig]

# 2

## Battle of Liebertwolkwitz 14 October

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Marshal Murat commanded several corps south of Leipzig and had been slowly withdrawing from the approaching Army of Bohemia. On the evening of 13 October Murat had intended to fall back over the north side of the River Parthe, but on hearing this, Napoleon sent orders for Murat to hold his position, which was a strong defensive one. Napoleon's headquarters were about 20 miles northwest of Leipzig, so by the time Murat received the order his troops were already in motion. However, he now turned his men around to hold the position about 4 miles south of Leipzig. Kaminiecki's division of Poniatowski's VIII corps (Polish) formed his right flank, anchored on the River Pleisse around the villages of Mark-Kleeberg, Dolitz and Connewitz (the corps' other division was detached elsewhere).Victor's II corps was adjacent, from Mark-Kleeberg to the village of Wachau. Lauriston's corps occupied the area from Wachau to Liebertwolkwitz forming Murat's left wing. Behind Lauriston, Murat placed the V Cavalry Corps (commanded by Pajol) plus Berckheim's First Light Cavalry Division (part of I Cavalry Corps). IV Cavalry Corps (Sokolnicki's Poles) was placed behind Poniatowski. A division of the Young Guard were about a mile behind Murat's left, at Holzhausen. Augereau's IX corps was three miles in the rear, just south of Leipzig.[21]

Wittgenstein, leading the allied forward troops, launched an attack on the morning of 14 October. From the Allied perspective, Liebertwolkwitz could be characterised as an encounter battle, with formations being thrown into the fray as they arrived. Pahlen's Russian cavalry corps led the way, arriving opposite Liebertwolkwitz. Klenau's infantry (Austrian IV Corps) arrived at Gross Posna at 9:00 a.m. and Eugen's Russian II Corps arrived on the left of Pahlen

shortly after. Gorchakov's Russian I Corps came up on the left of Eugen's corps.

Pahlen's forward light cavalry regiments were overthrown by some of Pajol's cavalry, but were rescued by the arrival of the Neumark Dragoons (Prussian cavalry from Kleist's II Prussian Corps). Murat then launched a massive attack with 5,000 cavalry from the area between Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau. Although each regiment was in line abreast, the whole force appeared as a column with Milhaud's dragoon division in front, L'Heretier's dragoon division in the middle and Piré's light cavalry division in the rear. This formation appeared to hamper their manoeuvrability as they were hit in the flank by Kleist's two regiments of Prussian cuirassiers and pushed back to Wachau.[22]

Wittgenstein had ordered Klenau to take Liebertwolkwitz, which would threaten Murat's left flank. Klenau's infantry attack went in at 11:30 a.m. Klenau's cavalry arrived to support the allied cavalry at 12:30 p.m.

At 2:00 p.m. Murat launched another great cavalry assault, in the same manner as before but adding Berckheim's light cavalry division in the rear. After some initial success, the front of the column was halted by heavy artillery fire when the Russian, Prussian and Austrian cavalry counter-attacked. The leading French division broke, disordering the troops in the rear. The whole column fled north.

The infantry fight for Liebertwolkwitz raged fiercely for several hours, with the Austrians taking part of the village, but by 5:00 p.m. the French had recovered all of it.

On the allied left, one of Pahlen's hussar regiments and a regiment of his Cossacks attacked the area between Mark-Kleeberg and Wachau. They were met by all of Sokolnicki's Polish cavalry who threw back the Russians. Kleist's Prussian Landwehr cavalry then drove the Poles back to their main line. Strong French artillery deterred the Allies making any further advance in this sector.

Prince Schwarzenberg arrived to order the action to be broken off about 6:00 p.m.

The Allies lost 2,500 killed and wounded and 500 captured. The French came off slightly better with 1,500 killed and wounded and 1,000 captured, but could ill afford the losses, especially in cavalry.[23] However, Murat had held his ground.

Some may dismiss the battle as futile and irrelevant to the main battle of Leipzig, as Shevardino was to Borodino. David Chandler only briefly mentions it in The Campaigns of Napoleon. But this is because the result was inconclusive. Liebertwolkwitz was important because of its size and outcome. One of Smith's sources, the Vicar of Taucha, said, 'The Allies had about 6,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry and 48 guns on the field by the end of the day; they were opposed by about 7,000 cavalry, 32,400 infantry and 121 guns'.[24] Chandler says that it was the biggest cavalry action of 1813.[25] The result was important to the French because if Murat had lost the position (the line of villages and high ground), it would have seriously compromised Napoleon's options for the battle to come. The 'high ground' did not comprise of great hills but ground that afforded excellent fields of fire.




[Map 4: The Historical Dispositions on 16 October]

# 3

# The Battle of Leipzig, 16 October 1813

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## French Plans and Deployment

Both sides spent 15 October marching further troops towards Leipzig. By the end of the day, MacDonald's XI Corps and Sebastiani's II Cavalry Corps had arrived at Taucha. Napoleon reconnoitred the ground in the south and ordered the remaining bridges over the Pleisse to be broken except for that at Dolitz. The bridge at Connewitz was also left intact, perhaps as an oversight.

Napoleon's plan for 16 October was influenced by the uncertainty of the location of Blucher's army. At one point, having seen the mass of enemy troops to the South, he thought that Blucher had somehow come round to the South. He intended to leave small, holding forces in the north and west while he concentrated the bulk of his army to deal a crushing blow against Schwarzenberg in the south. In all, about 53,000 men started in the north while about 110,000 men were allocated to the south. Here, Poniatowski, Victor and Lauriston, supported by the cavalry corps of Sokolnicki and Latour-Maubourg, were to pin the enemy frontally, while MacDonald and Sebastiani's cavalry enveloped the enemy's right wing. When the time was ripe, Napoleon would unleash the Guard, supported by Augereau and the rest of the available cavalry, to deliver the critical blow.

The Lindenau area in the west, which had been strengthened by three earthworks thrown up on 15 October, was to be held by the Leipzig garrison. Marshal Ney, commanding in the north, had under his orders: Marmont, Bertrand, Souham and Reynier's corps, although Reynier and half of Souham's corps were yet to arrive. Dombrowski's small Polish division was also approaching the northern sector from Duben. III Cavalry Corps (Arrighi) had been divided up between Marmont, Souham and the Leipzig garrison and hence is not listed separately in the order of battle. Arrighi was given command of the Leipzig garrison. The orders given to Marmont on 15 October were contingent: 'If tomorrow the 16th, the Army of Silesia [Blucher] does not approach from the direction of Halle [northwest of Leipzig] …', he was to move south through Leipzig to an area where he could support the southern offensive.[26]

The French deployment in the southern sector, from their right to left, was as follows: Lefol's independent division guarded the bridges at Connewitz; Poniatowski's VIII Corps (Polish) occupied Mark-Kleeberg and Dolitz including a manor house on the far side of the Pleisse (represented by an isolated building on the game map). Sokolnicki's IV Cavalry Corps (Polish) was on the hills to the west of Wachau. Victor's II Corps along with the Guard Artillery held the line from the Poles to and including Wachau. Augereau's IX Corps was roughly behind in close reserve and Lauriston's V Corps went from Victor to slightly east of Liebertwolkwitz. To the east of Lauriston would be, once they had come up from Taucha, MacDonald's IX Corps and Sebastiani's Cavalry Corps which formed the extreme left of the army. I Cavalry Corps (Latour-Maubourg) and V Cavalry Corps (Pajol) stood in the left rear near Holzhausen; and the bulk of the Guard took up positions behind Liebertwolkwitz, while Friant's Old Guard Division was in reserve around Probstheida.[27]

In the north, Bertrand was positioned at Eutritzsch. Marmont's large corps started in prepared positions from Lindenthal to Radefeld, a few kilometres north of Mockern. However, at 7:00 a.m. on 16 October Napoleon issued another order to Marmont's corps to move to the south of Leipzig. It took some time for the order to reach him and be enacted on. At 10:00 a.m. Blucher's advanced guard came into contact, causing Marmont to halt his men and occupy a new position around Mockern. The game gives this as the starting point for Marmont.

Southam's corps was east of Marmont. Dombrowski was at Plaussig.

## Allied Plans and Deployment

It was much harder for the allies to devise a co-ordinated plan, given the distances between their armies and the nature of coalitions but they had 15 October to do it. Blucher, who was already two thirds of the way from Halle to Leipzig, was to attack Leipzig from the northwest. Gyulai's Austrian corps, which had approached from Lützen in the southwest, was to attack Lindenau from Markranstadt. Gyulai's corps was understrength because it had detached troops to cover crossings over the River Saale, although it had been supplemented with Thielman's Streifkorps (raiding party) of Cossacks and Prussian light cavalry. Gyulai's orders for 16 October told him that St. Priest's Corps of the Army of Silesia would probably come the same way and if possible, he should detach troops to his right to support Meerveldt's attack on Connewitz. However, his main task was to maintain communications between the Armies of Silesia and Bohemia.[28]

Schwarzenberg appears to have thought that Connewitz was Napoleon's Achilles heel because his initial proposal for the southern sector included funnelling 52,000 men into the marshy triangle between the Elster and Pleisse. The Czar and his high command wisely objected and the final plan was reduced to just Meerveldt's corps attacking in this triangle, heading for the bridge at Connewitz, with Hessen-Homburg one and a quarter miles behind in reserve.

The main allied attack from the south was to be directed at the area from Mark-Kleeberg to Liebertwolkwitz. There was a complicated command structure in that Barclay de Tolly commanded all the forces to the east of the Pleisse, and under him Wittgenstein was to lead the first line of the attacking forces which were arranged in four columns. Kleist's Prussian corps was divided up, with one brigade being assigned to each of the columns. The first column, commanded by Klenau was made up of his own Austrian corps, Ziethen's brigade of Kleist's corps and the Prussian reserve cavalry under Roder. The second column was commanded by Gorchakov and consisted of his own Russian corps, less Helfreich's small division, plus Perch's Prussian brigade from Kleist's corps. The third column was led by Prince Eugen of Württemberg and comprised of the Russian II Corps plus Klux's Prussian brigade from Kleist's corps. The fourth column, commanded by Kleist, was made up of Preussen's brigade of his own corps, Helfreich's 14th Russian division (from Gorchakov's corps), Lewaschoff's Russian Cuirassier brigade (from Duka's Third Cuirassier Division) and the Lubno Hussars (from Pahlen's cavalry corps). The rest of Pahlen's cavalry also formed part of the first line. Platov's Don Cossacks covered the extreme right flank.

The first column (Klenau's) deployed across a one and a quarter mile frontage from the villages of Fuchshain to Gross-Posna. The second column (Gorchakov's) deployed across the two miles from Gross-Posna to Gulden Gossa. These two columns were to attack Liebertwolkwitz.

Pahlen's cavalry was next in line, with orders to attack the 'heights of Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau', meaning the high ground between the two. To the left of Pahlen was Württemberg's column, extending one and a quarter miles northwest of Gulden Gossa, with orders to take Wachau. Finally, Kleist's column occupied the left in front of Crostewitz, with his left flank resting on the Pleisse. His objective was to take Mark-Kleeberg.[29]

The sizes of the southern columns were as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Klenau | 33,000 men |
| Gorchakov | 9,000 men |
| Württemberg | 11,000 men |
| Kleist | 8,400 men |
| Pahlen | 5,400 cavalry[30] |

Archduke Constantine commanded the Reserve, of which Rajevski's Russian Grenadier Corps and the remainder of Duka's cavalry were about 80 minutes march south of the main line.[31] The Russo-Prussian Guard started a long way back, west of the Pleisse and were ordered to set out at 1:00 a.m. for Rotha where there was a crossing point over the Pleisse. They would then be in reserve about three miles from the front line.

Colloredo's approaching Austrian corps was intended to form a reserve behind Klenau, but in reality, was further away than it was understood to be.

In summary, the allies in the southern sector were deployed on a wide front, with their reserves a long way back, partly impeded by the Pleisse.

## The Battle in the West on 16 October

During the night of 15/16 October, an officer sent by Blucher informed Gyulai that St. Priest's corps would not be joining him because the terrain at Lindenau was difficult and even if they took it, it would be impossible to attack Leipzig across the causeway.[32]

Gyulai's troops started their advance from Markranstadt at 7:00 a.m. but did not commence their attack until 8:00 a.m., once they had heard the guns from the Wachau area, in order to maintain some

coordination. They were divided into three columns. The left column was to deliver a wide left hook, attacking Lindenau from the left after the centre column had bombarded it frontally with the artillery. The right column was to assault Lindenau from the right. One battalion was detached to a point three miles northwest of Markranstadt to cover the line of communications with the Army of Silesia, there being a ford over the Luppe at Horburg (off map) about five miles northwest of Markranstadt.[33]

The French, outnumbered at this stage but in a strong defensive position, surprisingly decided to attack with infantry and cavalry. An Austrian cavalry charge forced them back to Plagwitz Windmill. It may have been around this time that Arrighi sent an urgent message to Ney requesting reinforcements. It was shortly after 10:00 a.m. that Ney had ordered Bertrand's corps south from Eutritzsch to support the southern sector, in lieu of Marmont who was unable to comply with Napoleon's order. In response to Arrighi's plea, Ney diverted all of Bertrand's corps to Lindenau.

The Austrian right-hand column had to fight its way through Klein-Zschocher before advancing to Plagwitz which was strongly held and supported by artillery on the far side of the Elster. The assault failed.

The left column fought its way through outlying villages to reach Lindenau, which was partly ablaze from artillery fire. They succeeded in taking part of the village. The centre column now assaulted Lindenau but were thrown back.

Bertrand's corps arrived at about 11:00 a.m. and this deterred further Austrian assaults on Lindenau. At 5:00 p.m. Bertrand launched two assaults against Klein-Zschocher but Austrian counter-attacks retook it. At nightfall, the French were holding Lindenau and the Austrians the outlying villages. Gyulai had lost over 2,000 killed and wounded while the French about 800.[34]

## The Battle in the South (Wachau) on 16 October

Many in the allied camp were apprehensive of fighting Napoleon in person, in a prepared defensive position too. Nevertheless, the allies took the initiative by attacking first. However their assault was conducted in a piecemeal fashion due to their wide deployment. The early morning mist also affected their coordination and certainly delayed any attacks until 8:00 a.m. when it finally lifted.

Württemberg's column was the first to advance and was in close action against Victor's troops in Wachau by 8:30 a.m.

At 9:00 a.m. the Czar arrived on the height south of Gulden Gossa and saw that Wittgenstein's columns were widely dispersed. He immediately ordered the Russian second line of reserves (the Grenadier Corps and the cuirassiers) forward to a position about one mile south of Wachau and ordered the Russo-Prussian Guard to move forward to Crobern and Gulden Gossa. He also sent a request to Schwarzenberg to move the Austrian reserve (under Hessen-Homberg) over to the east side of the Pleisse.

Kleist, who was to the left of Württemberg, ordered Helfreich's small Russian division to take the 'heights' between Mark-Kleeberg and Wachau, with the Lubno Hussars covering their right flank. This they managed to achieve. After an artillery bombardment, Kleist's Prussians attacked Mark-Kleeberg from the front while Helfreich's battalions attacked it from the right and succeeded in pushing out the Poles. The 'French' counter-attacked with infantry and cavalry but

were thrown back by the Lubno Hussars and Lewaschoff's Russian Cuirassier Brigade. By 11:00 a.m. Kleist was holding Mark-Kleeberg but could make no further progress forward because of strong French artillery beyond.

Württemberg won possession of Wachau at around 9:30 a.m. but could not get beyond that, again because of formidable artillery fire. Württemberg's right had been led by his artillery, protected by Pahlen's cavalry. Napoleon had added the massed batteries of the Young Guard to this sector and together with Victor's artillery proved very effective, dismounting 24 of Württemberg's guns according to Nafziger,[35] although that seems extreme, being about half of his artillery. The French counter-attacked and after a fierce fight ejected Württemberg from Wachau and he withdrew to a position just south of the village where he stood at 11:00 a.m.

Meerveldt's advance on the far left between, the Pleisse and Elster, was slow going because of the marshy ground and he found that he could not bring up any artillery. The Austrian infantry tried to storm the blocked bridge at Connewitz, defended by some of Lefol's independent division, but its approaches were covered by artillery and they were beaten back. By 11.00 a.m. his attacks had stalled and all he had achieved was to take the manor house on his side of the Pleisse opposite Dolitz. Schwarzenberg, who was with Meerveldt's force, received the Czar's request at 10:30 a.m. (sent 9:00 a.m.). However, it was not until 12:00 noon that he could bring himself to give up his ambitions for this area and order Hessen-Homberg to move to the east side of the Pleisse.[36] This involved an hour's march back south to a crossing point over the Pleisse, two hours to cross the river and an hour's march north to reach Mark-Kleeberg. Therefore, it would not be until between 4:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. that they would be able to support Kleist. Would they arrive in time to get into action?

In the centre of the southern sector, Gorchakov's column debouched from the University Woods at about 7:30 a.m. and advanced on Liebertwolkwitz without waiting for Klenau to get into position. He probably could not see Klenau, who was on the far side of the wood around Gross Posna. Gorchakov's men ran into the full force of Lauriston's artillery and he never fully pressed home his attack, but retired in good order. This created a gap between Gorchakov and Württemberg. Napoleon's failure to exploit this was probably due to the fact that his left outflanking force (MacDonald and Sebastiani) was not yet in place, having started the morning in Taucha. Furthermore, Pahlen's cavalry to Gorchakov's left, which had also come under heavy fire, retired with Gorchakov to keep their mutual flanks secure and Pirch's Prussian brigade from Gorchakov's second line, was pushed into the gap.[37]

Sources differ on when Klenau set off from his starting position between Gross Posna and Fuchshain: Nafziger says 7:30 a.m. while Petre says 10:00 a.m. There is a consensus however, that Klenau was not in sight when Gorchakov attacked. Klenau's tardiness may be due to the fact that he had by far the biggest column to organise (33,000 men). He also had further to march, his being an enveloping move. He divided his infantry in half, the left heading for Liebertwolkwitz and the right, together with his cavalry, for the Kolmberg ('berg' means hill). After heavy street fighting with Lauriston's men, the Austrians captured most of the village, which was partly ruined from the fighting of 14 October.

From the Kolmberg, Klenau could see large French columns approaching from the north. These were Macdonald's corps and Sebastiani's cavalry corps. He sent a request to Pahlen for cavalry reinforcements.

By 11:00 a.m. Klenau's force was still fighting in Liebertwolkwitz and holding the Kolmberg, while MacDonald and Sebastiani were deploying between Holzhausen and Liebertwolkwitz.

Napoleon had joined Murat on the Galgenberg heights at 9:00 a.m. and observed the allies' developing attacks. He ordered up Augereau to support Poniatowski and also sent Letort's brigade of Guard cavalry (principally the Empress Dragoons) to support the Poles. Friant's Division of the Old Guard was moved up from Probstheida to a position about a mile behind Wachau.

At around 11:00 a.m. Napoleon decided it was time to go on the offensive, even though he was still expecting reinforcements from Marmont and Souham. MacDonald was ordered to storm the Kolmberg and then onwards to Seifertshain, turning the right flank of the Allies. Once this was done, he would advance all along the line of the southern sector.

MacDonald had four small divisions. He ordered Charpentier's to storm the Kolmberg. To his left, Ledru was to head for Seifertshain while Gérard's division was to head east towards Klein Posna. Marchand's division was held in reserve. Gérard's purpose was presumably to cover MacDonald's flank and rear.[38] He may have seen Platov's Cossacks who had been lurking behind the wood to the west of Klein Posna, although one would have thought some of Sebastiani's cavalry could have dealt with them. Charpentier succeeded in storming the Kolmberg, taking four guns in a ruined redoubt constructed by the Swedes in the Thirty Years War. Klenau was nearly captured, his horse having been killed. Von Toll, who was on the Allied General Staff, brought up a brigade of Klenau's corps, but it broke and fled after just one battalion got into action. This

brigade could have been cut to pieces by Sebastiani's cavalry were it not for Allied cavalry coming to the rescue. Pahlen had responded to Klenau's earlier request and sent him 14 squadrons (about half of his division) which arrived in the nick of time to deter Sebastiani. Some Cossacks, presumably Platov's, also arrived around this time.

Meanwhile, Lauriston drove the Austrians out of Liebertwolkwitz and they fell back all the way to Gross Posna. This induced Gorchakov to fall back to a line between Gulden Gossa and the University Wood.

Pahlen retired in sympathy, but Württemberg obstinately held his position despite heavy losses.

There was a see-saw battle in the Mark-Kleeberg area. Kleist was forced back, leaving a small detachment stuck in the village. He was reinforced with Rajewski's Russian grenadiers and was able to push forward to the heights between Mark-Kleeberg and Wachau, but Poniatowski and Augereau slowly pushed him back again to Crobern.

During MacDonald's advance on the French left, I Cavalry Corps (Latour-Maubourg) and the Guard cavalry massed behind the Galgenberg, while Drouot formed a grand battery of 84 guns in front of the Galgenberg. Victor's men formed into columns of attack, with Oudinot's Young Guard Corps to his left. Lauriston also formed up, with Mortier's Young Guard Corps behind him. Friant's Old Guard division moved towards Wachau.

At about 2:00 p.m. Lauriston marched on Gulden Gossa while Mortier swung out onto his left and headed towards the University Wood. Victor and Oudinot advanced to the right of Lauriston. By this time MacDonald, on the French left, was advancing on Seifertshain, while Augereau was driving Kleist back to Crobern.

Kleist was saved by the timely arrival of Nostitz's Austrian Cuirassier division, which was the first part of Hessen-Homburg's Austrian reserve to arrive from the far side of the Pleisse. They repulsed Letort's brigade of Guard cavalry and Berckheim's light cavalry (part of Latour-Maubourg's I Cavalry Corps), but suffered casualties from French infantry squares and ran into more French cavalry, resulting in them being driven back to Cobern.

The French I Cavalry Corps was now under the command of Doumerc after Latour-Maubourg lost a leg from cannon fire. At 2:30 p.m. Doumerc sent Bordessoulle's cuirassier division of 18 squadrons forward from behind the Galgenberg, passing to the right of Drouot's grand battery. Bordessoulle sent four of his Saxon squadrons to his right against an allied battery while he charged forward with his remaining 12 squadrons. They broke through one of Württemberg's battalions while another managed to form into square in time. Bordessoulle's men had taken 26 guns, which must have been the remainder of Württemberg's artillery. They continued to a position close to the knoll where the Czar and the King of Prussia were observing the battle where they were charged by the Czar's Cossack escort and hit in the flank by 13 squadrons of Russian cuirassiers. The French, whose horses were now blown, were driven back in confusion behind Drouot's battery, whose cannister fire brought the Allied pursuit to an end.

At 4:00 p.m. Bianchi's Division of Hessen-Homberg's Austrian Reserve Corps, finally arrived from the far side of the Pleisse to support Kleist who was struggling against Victor's and Augereau's troops around Crobern.[39] Rajewski's division of Russian grenadiers, which had been supporting Kleist, could now move right, behind Württemberg to support him. The Prussian Guard was now marching on Gulden Gossa where there was a massed battery of 94 Russian guns.

At the same time on the French left, Gérard and Sebastiani had occupied Klein Posna and Ledru was advancing on Seifertshain, which he stormed at 5:00 p.m., taking and retaking it several times. On Ledru's right, Charpentier drove the Austrians out of the wood to the northwest of Gross Posna, but failed to take that village from

Ziethen's Prussian brigade. Further right, Mortier's Young Guard attacked the larger wood but failed to make headway.

As night fell the French left pulled back to a more defensive position. Gérard moved from Klein Posna to Fuchshain while Ledru joined Marchand on the Kolmberg.

In the centre, Lauriston had fought his way into Gulden Gossa but was driven back in disorder by Allied reinforcements. To his right, part of Victor's corps had advanced about a mile south of Wachau. The rest of Victor's corps and Augereau were pushed back from before Cobern by Bianchi's Austrian division. Earlier, at around 3:00 p.m. on the west side of the Pleisse, Meerveldt had eventually managed to drag some guns up to Dolitz Manor and put some pressure on the French right flank holding the other side of the Pleisse.[40] Towards the end of the day Bianchi was reinforced by the arrival of Weissenwolf 's Austrian grenadier division (the remainder of Hessen-Homberg's corps) and was then able to retake Mark-Kleeberg and then Dolitz.

By around 5:30 p.m. Meerveldt had thrown an infantry bridge over the Pleisse near Dolitz and he boldly crossed into Dolitz. Being very short-sighted, he had mistaken French troops for Prussians. Napoleon had shored up his crumbling right by sending in Curial's Old Guard division and Ricard's division of Souham's corps (the only reinforcement that had arrived from the north). Meerveldt's horse was shot and he was taken prisoner.

By nightfall the French had retaken Dolitz and the manor house on the far bank, driving back over the Pleisse those of Meerveldt's troops who had crossed and pushing back Bianchi towards Mark-Kleeberg, which he retained.

## The Battle in the North (Mockern) on 16 October

Marmont initially occupied a position starting about one and a quarter miles northwest of Mockern, from the Elster on his left, northeast through Lindenthal and Breitenfeld, with an outpost at Radefeld (about two and a half miles north of Lindenthal). He also occupied the wood northeast of Lindenthal. This position was an extended one but he had been assured of the support of III Corps (Souham) if threatened by Blucher. He built fortifications, including redoubts for guns and abatis in the wood. Napoleon had even sent him an account of the 1631 Battle of Breitenfeld to study (where the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus, had defeated the Imperial General Tilly in the Thirty Years' War).

During the night of 15 October, Marmont saw the campfires of Blucher's army in the distance and informed Napoleon that he definitely would be needing III Corps. Meanwhile in Blucher's camp, General Stewart had brought a message from Bernadotte saying that he was too far away to offer help on 16 October but could support with 8,000–10,000 cavalry and light artillery on 17 October. Blucher would be on his own on 16 October, but he would attack Napoleon anyway.

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Blucher acted with caution on 16 October not just because he was without Bernadotte's support, but also, he had been previously aware of possibly strong French forces north of Leipzig around Duben. He started the day by sending out his entire cavalry on a reconnaissance and they reported back Marmont's initial positions and he based his orders on that information. [41] Langeron's Russian corps was to form the left wing and attack Radefeld, with Sacken's Russian corps behind in reserve. Yorck's Prussian corps was to form the right wing and move on Lindenthal. St. Priest's Russian corps, once it arrived, would follow Langeron and Sacken. The advance began at 10:00 a.m., which was about the time that Marmont started moving south in compliance with Napoleon's order sent at 7:00 a.m. which dismissed the threat from Blucher.

Riding with Langeron, Blucher reached Radefeld and was surprised to see the French withdrawing. Langeron continued on to Breitenfeld and watched for a French attack from the east. Meanwhile Yorck was advancing on Mockern and had driven away Marmont's light cavalry from Lindenthal. He then moved one of his four brigades to his left to plug the gap that was developing between him and Langeron.

Marmont and Ney realised they could not comply with Napoleon's order and Marmont formed a new line with his left anchored on Mockern and his right on a marshy brook to the east. Beyond the brook, Dombrowski was approaching the villages of Gross and Klein

Wiederitzsch. In addition, Fournier's light cavalry division was still there, Ney having sent the rest of Souham's corps south.

By about 2:00 p.m. Blucher realised that the French were not defending the area to his east and he ordered Langeron to clear Wiederitzsch to his south (now held by Dombrowski's Poles). However, he was still concerned for his left flank because of reports of French troops coming from Duben and kept Sacken and part of Langeron's troops facing in that direction.

French dragoons. (Mark Freeth, The Wargames Holiday Centre)

The Poles were heavily outnumbered. Dombrowski's division was, in reality, no more than brigade strength and they were facing the Advanced Guard and Kapsevich's division of Langeron's corps. Nevertheless, they put up a fierce fight against their Russian enemies but by 3:00 p.m. they were driven back towards Eutritzsch. Fournier's light cavalry division and part of De France's heavy cavalry then charged Kapsevich and ejected them from around Wiederitzsch, allowing the Poles to rally. A further attack by Kapsevich retook the villages and threw the Poles back to Eutritzsch in disorder. Ney recalled Souham's two divisions, who were marching south, to support the northern sector. He later rescinded this and sent them south again.

Delmas' French division now appeared on the road from Duben. The size of the wagon train that Delmas was escorting fooled Kapsevich into thinking he had a whole corps approaching his flank and rear and he withdrew to the wood northeast of Wiederitzsch, while Olusiev's division deployed to face Delmas. Delmas detached some of his command to cover his right while he hurried his convoy across the Parthe, however he had lost about 100 wagons along the way from Duben to pursuing Cossacks.[42] The journal of III Corps appears to have claimed that Delmas safely escorted his charges into Leipzig before bivouacking for the night in Eutritzsch.[43]

At about the same time that Kapsevich had made his first attack on the Poles, Yorck made his first attack on Mockern with his Advance Guard with Mecklenburg's brigade in support on its left. Fierce fighting ensued for some hours, with the village changing hands several times. Yorck later widened his attack to Marmont's centre but Mecklenburg's brigade was driven back with heavy casualties from artillery fire. Just then a French ammunition wagon exploded, setting off other wagons, slightly wounding Marmont and causing the

gunners to flee. The Prussians rushed forward to seize the guns only to be hit in the flank by Compans' division. The Prussians then fled. Compans' pursuit was only checked by cannister fire from the Prussian guns.

By 5:00 p.m. both sides around Mockern were approaching breaking point but Yorck launched Steinmetz's brigade in an attack just to the north of Mockern. The first line of the brigade broke and fled from artillery and musket fire, crashing into the second line. Now was the time for Marmont to administer the coup de grace. Now was the time to launch the cavalry! He ordered his Württemberg cavalry brigade to charge but their commander, Generalmajor Normann, refused.[44] Was this treachery? They made a charge later, but the moment of opportunity had passed. Marmont's other light cavalry division (Lorge) was on his right flank and so he had to make do with his infantry to pursue the Prussians.

Yorck now had no fresh infantry. He could have ordered a retreat and tried to cover it with his cavalry, but he decided instead to use all of his cavalry in one final attack. It was his last throw of the dice. And he threw a double six! His cavalry rode down two battalions, drove away most of the French cavalry and got into Marmont's batteries where there was a mixed melee of cavalry, infantry and gunners. The French gave way, leaving 35 guns behind.

Marmont covered his retreat with his unbroken right, falling back behind the brook with his right withdrawing to Eutritzsch. He himself went to the Outer Halle Gate in Leipzig where he ordered General von Franquemont's 38th Division to also cover his retreat.[45] They advanced to the brook, forming Marmont's left flank. This 'division', which was part of Bertrand's IV Corps, was a mixed force of Württemberg infantry and cavalry of just brigade strength.

Blucher, who had remained with Langeron, called forward Sacken at 5:00 p.m. but he was four miles away. St. Priest had been called forward earlier but only one of his brigades had got into action around Wiederitzsch.

As night fell, the Allies camped holding a line south of Mockern to north of Eutritzsch. Blucher had won a victory but the bulk of the fighting had been done by Yorck's corps who all joined in singing a hymn in thanksgiving. It should be noted that almost half his men were Landwehr. Yorck had lost 8,000 men (over a third of his force) as casualties. Langeron lost 1,500. Marmont's casualties are uncertain but he reported seven to eight thousand (about 40 percent of his corps). He also lost 53 guns and many ammunition wagons. His divisional generals, Compans and Friedrichs, had been wounded and he had been wounded twice although remained in command.[46] Crucially, Napoleon's route to the north and northwest had been blocked.

## Overall Result of 16 October

Given the chaos of battle, casualties for the whole battle of 16 October are uncertain. Chandler's estimate was that the Allies lost c.30,000 including 2,000 prisoners, while the French lost c.25,000.[47] Apart from Borodino, it was the highest number of casualties suffered in a single day in the Napoleonic wars and would not be surpassed until the First World War.

Napoleon’s main attack in the south had failed to break the Allies. He could expect reinforcements of only 14,000 when Reynier’s corps arrived (they were currently several miles northwest of Taucha). He was aware from prisoners that the Allies were expecting Bennigsen’s Russian Army of Poland (70,000) and Bernadotte’s Army of the North (70,000) to arrive on 17 October. Colloredo’s Austrian corps was also approaching. Chandler estimates that these reinforcements would take the French up to a strength of 200,000 men and 900 guns and the Allies up to 300,000 and 1,500 guns. Furthermore, the French were low on food and ammunition. Both Bertrand and Poniatowski reported that they were almost completely out of ammunition and urgently needed resupplying overnight. There was scarcely enough ammunition overall for a repetition of the day’s battle. The men were cold, tired and hungry and had to face another wet and windy night bivouacking in the open, surrounded by the dead and dying.



Map 5: The Historical Dispositions on 18 October

# 4

## The Battle of Leipzig, 17 and 18 October 1813

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### 17 October

Sunday 17 October was another rainy day. In the south, both sides formed up ready for battle but did not engage. The Army of Bohemia planned to attack once Colloredo's corps and Bennigsen's Army of Poland had arrived. However it became apparent that they were too far away and the Allies were content to wait. Colloredo arrived towards the end of the day; his men exhausted from their forced march. Bennigsen's advanced guard began to arrive at Fuchshain in the evening.

The Allies expected Napoleon to try to break out from his encirclement but were in two minds as to the direction he would take. Some thought he would head west to the Saale, but that would involve getting his whole army across the causeway to Lindenau. Others thought he would head north back to Duben on the River Mulde. This was where many of his troops had arrived from and where his previous main lines of communication lay, although these were now compromised by the Armies of the North and of Silesia. Allied indecision resulted in their deployments staying roughly where they were at the end of 16 October.

Communication remained a problem for the Allies. On the morning of 17 October, Schwarzenberg was not aware of Blucher's victory of the previous day and he was still expecting Blucher to have sent St. Priest's corps south to the Lindenau sector. Schwarzenberg ordered Gyulai to move the bulk of his troops from the Lindenau sector east to Crobern. This was later changed to be conditional on the arrival of St. Priest. The result was that Gyulai's men spent 17 October marching back and forth. Unfortunately, Crenneville's division did not receive the order to turn back and went all the way to Connewitz and did not return to the rest of Gyulai's corps until the morning of the 18th.[48] This chaos was to give Bertrand's French virtually a free hand on 18 October.

In the north there was disagreement between Blucher and Bernadotte. Blucher wanted to continue his assault towards Leipzig and for Bernadotte to sweep round to attack further east towards Taucha. Bernadotte was still intent on hanging back to cover their left flank from the mythical French threat from the east. More realistically, he was also worried that if Napoleon tried to break out north via Taucha, he would be in the way of the bulk of the French army. Later he sent a regiment of Cossacks to try to destroy the bridge at Taucha, but it was held by the French. An aggressive general would have sought to take the bridge intact.

Blucher went to meet Bernadotte in person to persuade him to join the attack. Blucher did not entirely trust Bernadotte and took Prince Wilhelm of Prussia (the King's brother) to the meeting; the intention being that if Bernadotte failed to co-operate, Prince Wilhelm would take control of Bulow's Prussian corps from Bernadotte. According to Gneisenau, Prince Wilhelm made a threat to Bernadotte's face that he would strip him of all Allied troops except the Swedes.[49] Whether or not this was true, the outcome was Bernadotte's agreement to

attack but on condition that Langeron's Russian corps was transferred from the Army of Silesia to Bernadotte's Army of the North. As a precaution, Blucher wrote directly to Bulow and Wintzingerode (commander of Bernadotte's Russian corps) asking them to join the offensive.

Blucher commenced the assault with Sacken's Russian corps now in the first line around Mockern. Yorck's depleted corps was moved to the rear in reserve. Although Marmont had previously fallen back behind the Parthe, leaving an outpost at Gohlis, Delmas' division was still at Eutritzsch. Delmas was evicted from Eutritzsch without much of a struggle and ran back over the Parthe. At 10:00 a.m. Blucher received word from Schwarzenberg that they were delaying their attack until the morrow and so Blucher called off his attack.

On the morning of the 17th, Napoleon conferred with Murat and received reports, including confirmation that Reynier's corps had arrived safely at Taucha, then he had a long conversation with the captured Austrian General Meerveldt. He already knew that the Bavarians had deserted his cause, but he now learnt from Meerveldt that they had actively joined the Austrians on the river Inn and were about to march on Frankfurt, threatening his communications to the southwest.[50] He released Meerveldt to carry a message to Napoleon's father-in-law, Emperor Francis of Austria, offering an armistice. The Allies did not respond to this, taking it for what it was, a sign of weakness.

Napoleon eventually decided on a retreat to the southwest. There were several crossing points over the Saale and he chose Weissenfels, which happened to be held by an Austrian brigade that had been detached from Gyulai's corps. His ultimate destination beyond the Saale was Erfurt (about 85 miles from Leipzig) whose

fortress contained a large French arsenal. The evacuation of the transports would only begin on 18th because it was not until 7:00 p.m. on 17 October that he issued warning orders for Bertrand's corps to prepare to march to secure the Saale crossing at Weissenfels. Bertrand was also to take Guilleminot's division (French) from Reynier's corps – a brigade from De France's Fourth Heavy Cavalry Division – and importantly, General Baron Rogniat, the commander of the engineers, for any bridging work required.[51]

The bridge over the Elster was to be prepared for demolition once the last unit had been evacuated, but Napoleon neglected to order additional, temporary bridges to be built. The whole army would have to cross the causeway. Although his main bridging train was blockaded in Torgau, he had other engineers who could have improvised something.

Mortier's corps of two Young Guard divisions was ordered to Lindenau to replace Bertrand. Apart from that, Napoleon made only minor changes to his dispositions. A Baden battalion of the Leipzig garrison relieved Franquemont's Württembergers at the Halle Gate, allowing for the latter to rejoin Bertrand's corps. Souham's two original divisions rejoined Ney in the north, the divisions of III Cavalry Corps were reunited in the north and the unfortunate citizens of Leipzig were put to work on the defences.

## 18 October

After casualties and deducting Bertrand's force, Petre estimated that the French were now down to about 160,000 men, while the Allies had been reinforced to about 295,000.[52] Smith estimates 135,000

facing 264,000.[53] The odds were mitigated by not all of Bernadotte's Army of the North being close enough to engage immediately and 17,000[54] of the Allies being Cossacks who were of limited value on the battlefield, but they were bad enough to put Napoleon on the defensive.

The Allied plan involved organising their forces into six columns, all of which were to attack. The first column, the left wing of the southern sector, was commanded by Hessen-Homberg. In addition to his own Austrian Reserve Corps, he was given Colloredo's newly arrived Austrian corps and Meerveldt's Austrian corps, giving him around 40,000 men in total. Lederer's division of Meerveldt's Corps remained on the west side of the Pleisse. The rest of Hessen-Homburg's force were drawn up from Mark-Kleeberg to opposite Wachau.

The second column, to the right of Hessen-Homberg, was commanded by Barclay and consisted of Kleist's Prussian corps (less Ziethen's brigade which was still attached to Klenau), Wittgenstein's Russians (Gorchakov and Württemberg's corps), the Russo-Prussian Guard and the Russian Grenadier Reserve, totalling around 50,000. They were to attack Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz and then move on to Probstheida.

The third column was commanded by Bennigsen and was comprised of his own Russian corps, Klenau's Austrian corps (with Ziethen's Prussians), Pahlen's Russian cavalry, Platov's Cossacks and Bubna's Austrian light division. Bubna was nominally part of Colloredo's corps but had been operating separately and joined Bennigsen on the road to Leipzig. Bennigsen started between Fuchshain and Seifertshain. The main body was to take the Kolmberg and then make an enveloping move to take Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen from MacDonald. Bubna was to be on the right flank

and head for Klein Posna and then Paunsdorf. Platov was to form the link with the Army of the North.

Bernadotte commanded the fourth column of 80,000 men – the Army of the North, which had been enlarged by the corps of Langeron and St. Priest. They were to attack across the Parthe from the north and also swing round via Taucha to attack in the area from the Parthe to Paunsdorf.

Blucher commanded the fifth column of 25,000 men. Sacken's Russian corps was to attack the northern approaches of Leipzig. Yorck's depleted corps was kept behind in reserve.

Gyulai's force was the sixth column and was to attack Lindenau again.

Most of the Allies began their advance at 7:00 a.m. Early morning mist cleared to reveal fine weather. They were soon surprised to find only light resistance in many places. Earlier, at 2:00 a.m. Napoleon had ordered his forces to pull back to another line, leaving outposts in his previous positions. This meant giving up some strongpoints, but he shortened his front so that his forces were not thinly spread. He also organised his army under three sector commanders: Ney in the north, Macdonald in the east (the centre) and Murat in the south.

In the north, the survivors of Dombrowski's infantry occupied Pfaffendorf (north of the Parthe) and Margaron's Leipzig garrison occupied the Halle suburb and the Halle gate. Lorge's light cavalry division of III Cavalry Corps were also north of the river. Marmont's

infantry defended from Schonefeld on the south bank of the Parthe, to halfway to Paunsdorf. Taucha was evacuated and Reynier's Saxon division (under von Zeschau) was pulled back to a line from Paunsdorf to Marmont's right, leaving an outpost at Heiterer Blick farm and his French division (Durrette's) was now behind in reserve at Sellerhausen. Souham's corps and the remainder of III Cavalry Corps were in reserve behind Schonefeld.

In the centre, MacDonald abandoned the Kolmberg and pulled his corps back to Zuckelhausen, Holzhausen and behind. Lauriston gave up the smouldering ruins of Liebertwolkwitz to fall back to a line from Zweinaundorf to Molkau, placing part of his corps behind MacDonald in reserve. The Guard cavalry was also in this sector.

In the south, Victor was withdrawn from Wachau to the next strongpoint of Probstheida and west to Augereau and Poniatowski who maintained their previous line from Connewitz to Lossnig, Dolitz and Dosen. The remnants of Dombrowski's cavalry brigade came down from the north to join their fellow countrymen under Sokolnicki. Lefol remained on the east bank of the Pleisse. The Guard infantry (ex-Mortier) and I Cavalry Corps were the reserve in this sector (the latter now commanded by Milhaud, Latour-Maubourg having lost a leg on 16 October).

## Allies' First Column – Hessen-Homberg

Of the Allies, Hessen-Homberg's column started closest to the French and was supposed to wait until the second column had come up on their right. However, once he realised that the French had largely withdrawn from the front of the second column, he decided

not to wait and sent his men into action at 8:00 a.m. His first line, made up of a mixture of Colloredo's corps and his own Austrian Reserve Corps, advanced between Wachau and the Pleisse and quickly ejected the French outpost at the Meusdorf farm. The French counter-attacked however and nearly retook the farm. Hardegg's division took Dosen but there was heavy fighting in this area for some time. Augereau, supported by a division of the Young Guard, retook Dosen around 2:00 p.m. causing such consternation in the Allied HQ that they ordered Gyulai to be recalled from the Lindenau sector (later countermanded) and called up Duka's Russian cuirassier division from the reserve. The Austrians eventually retook Dosen.

On the west side of the Pleisse, Lederer's men had managed to manhandle a few guns to bombard the French flank, in support of an Austrian attack on the east side against Dolitz and Lossnig which was successful, but with the help of the Young Guard, the French retook them. Lederer's attack on Connewitz failed but induced Napoleon to send a brigade of the Old Guard to bolster this area. After over half a day of intense fighting, the Allies had failed to make significant progress in this sector. Hessen-Homberg was wounded and succeeded by Colloredo.

## Second Column – Barclay

The second column set off from around Auenhain at 8:00 a.m. aiming for the area Wachau to Liebertwolkwitz. Kleist, on the left, found Wachau empty and pushed on to Meusdorf farm where the Austrians of the first column were already engaged. The right took Liebertwolkwitz easily, as it was only held by an outpost. The column then advanced to opposite Probstheida which was defended by Victor, supported by artillery of the Young Guard on either side of it. Barclay halted at about 2:00 p.m. to wait for the columns on his flanks

to catch up but was overruled by the Czar who ordered the second column to attack alone.

The village of Probstheida had two walls, but because they were only made of clay and timber, cannonballs could penetrate them, leaving a small hole without demolishing the wall.[55] Kleist's Prussian brigades of Pirch and Prince August led the attack, supported by Eugen's 'corps' (now down to 1,800 men). They discovered that the outer wall was unoccupied but on crossing it, found themselves in gardens which became a killing field because the inner wall was heavily manned. Nevertheless, the Prussians eventually found a way into the village and drove the defenders out. Victor launched an immediate counterattack and retook the village, only to be driven out by a second Prussian assault which took heavy casualties from the Young Guard artillery on the way. Lauriston's corps now relieved Victor's exhausted corps and retook most of the village for the French. Kleist did not give up but attacked for a third time, now joined by Ziethen's Prussian brigade which arrived from Zuckelhausen, having previously been attached to Klenau (part of Bennigsen's column). This attack was repulsed and the Prussians retreated to Zuckelhausen. In the late afternoon, Napoleon personally brought forward Friant's division of the Old Guard to Probstheida where they mopped up resistance but were not able to advance further because of strong Allied artillery opposite.

## Third Column – Bennigsen

The third column assembled at 6:00 a.m. from Gross Posna to Fuchshain to opposite Klein Posna, but waited for Bubna's small light division to get into position before starting. Bubna had been delayed crossing the Partha at Beucha because the bridge there was carried away. While his infantry and guns waded the river with great difficulty,

his artillery ammunition wagons had to be left to take a wide detour to cross by a bridge some miles further north. Bubna and Platov were ordered to operate on Bennigsen's extreme right, forming the link with Bernadotte. Bubna was sent to take Klein Posna, which had been occupied by the French, another column was to attack the Kolmberg from Seifertshain and a third column was to attack the Kolmberg from the south. Ziethen's Prussian brigade was to clear the Neider Holz (the north wood) and then to move north to the area between the Kolmberg and Liebertwolkwitz, forming a link with Barclay's right. It transpired that the French had fallen back from all of these objectives and it was 10:00 a.m. before any opposition was met when the Allies reached the area before Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, held by MacDonald's corps.

There was no sign of Bernadotte, which meant Bennigsen's right flank was open. It was perhaps because of this that Bennigsen's assault did not begin until around 1:00 p.m. when Heldensfeld's division of Klenau's corps attacked Charpentier's division in Holzhausen, taking part of the village. Charpentier, reinforced, managed to drive out the attackers before Docturov's Russian corps advanced to the north of the village. Charpentier's division broke and fled back onto Gerard's division which was in reserve in the rear. Klenau sent his Austrian cavalry in pursuit and they captured some guns. Heldensfeld and most of the Russians joined the pursuit towards Stotteritz, creating a gap in their line which was exploited by Sebastiani's cavalry, but all they achieved was forcing the Russians into square while Sebastiani was wounded. Pahlen's Russian cavalry then made an attack from around Zuckelhausen and overpowered Walther's Guard cavalry division who also retired to Stotteritz. Pahlen was stunned after being unhorsed.

Around the time that Holzhausen was attacked, Zuckelhausen was attacked from the south by Ziethen's brigade and from the east by Hohenlohe's division of Klenau's Austrian corps. The defending

Badeners and Hessians of Marchand's division retired in good order towards Stotteritz, partly because the loss of Holzhausen made their position vulnerable. Gerard's division which was behind in support, also retired. Ziethen's brigade was then released to return to Kleist's corps in Barclay's column.

Bubna took Klein Posna without opposition and then headed towards Paunsdorf, while Platov's Cossacks crossed the Parthe at Taucha.

The overall effect of Bennigsen's advance on the French position was like a door being pushed back, with Probstheida as its hinge, making that village all the more important. MacDonald's divisions formed a new line from Stotteritz to Zweinaundorf and then up to Paunsdorf which was held by Reynier.

Bubna had reached Paunsdorf at 10:00 a.m. and bombarded the village for two hours before assaulting it. His first attack failed but his second attempt caused Reynier to pull back to Sellerhausen.[56] This was a remarkable feat because Bubna's Light Division consisted of just four battalions (one of which was landwehr), one and half batteries of light guns and 10 squadrons of light cavalry. Less surprisingly, Reynier was able to retake Paunsdorf.

## Fourth Column – Bernadotte

The fourth column, commanded by Bernadotte, took a long time to get into action. They had a long march to make but they were late in starting. Bulow's corps did not set off until 9:00 a.m. He was ordered

to swing round to force a passage over the Parthe at Taucha, but send detachments to watch for the enemy in the east. Bulow found that the French had evacuated Taucha and was able to use its bridge to get two of his divisions across. His other division crossed the river a little to the north of Taucha. Wintzingerode's corps was to follow up behind Bulow, sending his cavalry out to cover their left flank and rear. In fact the French threat from this direction was not entirely mythical because some Cossacks found a wagon train near Eilenberg and tried to take it, but its German escorts fought them off and the train retired to Torgau.

Langeron was to search for passages and throw bridges over the Parthe in the area from Taucha west to Mochau. The order of battle shows that Langeron had two companies of pontooniers as well as pioneers. The Swedish corps was to follow up, but in effect was safely in the rear. Bernadotte ordered that if the French attacked north, attempting a breakout, all of his command was to remain on the north bank of the Parthe.

Although Langeron's group, including St. Priest, was now under Bernadotte's command, Blucher remained with them and gave orders at least until they had crossed the river at 11:00 a.m. and were committed to the fight. Some of Langeron's cavalry had crossed at 10:00 a.m. near Mockern and advanced towards Heiterer Blick farm and sheep pens, where Reynier had left a Saxon outpost. Reynier sent his Saxon light cavalry to block them but they were repulsed. On reforming, the Saxon officers held a hasty conference. Petre's account says that at this point they were cut off from the French main body by Platov's Cossacks. They decided to defect to the Allies immediately. The Russians accepted that the Saxons were not expected to fight their erstwhile Allies and they were sent to join Yorck in the rear and took no further part in the battle, with the exception of a horse battery which the Russians needed. This left a Saxon light battalion stranded (presumably the outpost at Heiterer Blick). They

surrendered to the Russians but were allowed to keep their arms and sent to the rear. Around this time, Marmont's Württemberg cavalry, commanded by Normann, who had refused to charge at a critical time on 16 October, also defected.

The French had left a garrison in Mockau on the north bank of the Parthe, but they were quickly evicted by Langeron's advance guard. Part of Langeron's force had already crossed the Parthe between

Mockau and Plosen before Bulow's corps had approached from Taucha. Ney saw the threat and pulled Marmont back to the Schonefeld-Paunsdorf line.

By 2:00 p.m. Bulow's corps had formed a line running north–south, from Plaussig through Heiterer Blick, and was able to relieve Bubna from in front of Paunsdorf, enabling Bennigsen to reduce his extended front. The Prussians were accompanied by the British Royal Horse Artillery Rocket Troop, whose Congreve rockets have a reputation for being inaccurate and dangerous to their crews. On this occasion they bombarded Paunsdorf to good effect. They appear to have had a significant effect on the morale of troops under their fire, as General Stewart observed a little later, they 'Paralysed a solid square of infantry who delivered themselves up as if in a panic'.[57] The troop commander, Captain Bogue, had been given a squadron of Russian dragoons as an escort and he could not resist leading them in a charge. Sadly, he was killed by a musket ball. Paunsdorf was taken and the defenders fell back on Sellerhausen.

It was from around Sellerhausen that Reynier's Saxon infantry division defected at 5:00 p.m. After they had seen the Saxon light cavalry defect in the morning, they had sent an envoy to their King in Leipzig to ask what they should do. His response, received at 2:00 p.m., was unhelpfully ambiguous, merely saying that he was sure they would do their duty. At a meeting of the officers, the majority decided to go over to the Allies. They knew the battle was lost and suspected that Napoleon would sacrifice the Saxons to save the French, as he had done at the Berezina and they wished to preserve what was left of the army. Saxony had been laid waste by armies living off the land. The division's commander, von Zeschau, tried to stop them but all he could do was to lead 600 loyalists back to Leipzig. The rest marched towards the enemy, initially cheered on by the French who thought they were making an attack. They were careful to approach the Russians rather than Prussians because their

traditional rivalry with the latter would have caused more distrust and the potential for bloodshed. The Russians sent them to the rear and they did not have to fight the French. Elsewhere, the Saxon heavy cavalry remained loyal to Napoleon. Total defections amounted to about 4,000 men and 20 guns.[58]

Once Bulow was in action, Bennigsen resumed his advance. Klenau attacked Zweinaundorf, which changed hands a few times before he secured it, while Bubna stormed Molkau to its north. The French cavalry of Sebastiani and Walther's Guard cavalry division, made another sally against the Russians but had to retire due to strong allied artillery. Klenau went on to attack Stotteritz but the defenders held, making good use of walls and ditches. The Young Guard artillery flanking Probstheida appear to have been able to turn their guns into Klenau's flank.

The loss of Paunsdorf had exposed Marmont's flank so he had to wheel his right back. Ney launched a counterattack to retake Zweinaundorf but was repulsed, but Durette succeeded in retaking Sellerhausen.

Going back to the northern sector, Langeron received orders from Bernadotte shortly after 2:00 p.m. Now that most of the Army of the North was over the Parthe, he was to attack Schonefeld and so began a fight that was to last for several hours. The village was easily defended by walls and ditches and the marshy banks of the Parthe made it difficult to outflank. Marmont defended it with Lagrange's division; with Freidrichs' division on its right. Nevertheless, the Russians managed to get into part of the village before being ejected. The Russians' task became easier after Marmont was forced to realign his front after the loss of Paunsdorf. Freiderichs was pulled back, which allowed St. Priest to attack from one side while

Kapsevich bombarded from the other (both part of Langeron's command). With his guns silenced, Marmont withdrew Lagrange and Freiderichs to Reudnitz at 4:30 p.m.

Marshal Ney now used his reserve, Souham's two divisions, to retake Schonfeld, an assault in which both Ney and Souham were wounded. Langeron retired because his artillery was now out of ammunition, but Bernadotte replaced Langeron's guns with 60 from Wintzingerode and 20 from the Swedish corps.[59] The Russian assault was renewed and Souham retreated in disorder to Reudnitz where they reformed, only to be pushed back a little further at 9:00 p.m.

The Swedish corps arrived in the evening but was too late to get into action. They may have used bridges over the Parthe that Prussian engineers had improvised near Plaussig by pushing wagons into the river, felling trees to produce logs to cover the wagons and then using doors (including the great doors of the manor house) as planking to go over the logs.[60]

## 5th Column – Blucher

The attack by Sacken's Russian corps on the northern approaches to Leipzig did not begin until 10:00 a.m.; no doubt waiting for Bernadotte's column to get into position. It was led by Neverovsky's 27th Division of about 3,000 men, who had performed well at Borodino the previous year and later supported by Sacken's two other divisions. Pfaffendorf village to the north of the Parthe, which was being used as a field hospital and full of wounded, was defended by Dombrowski's infantry, now down to about 1,300 men. The Poles also occupied the area before the outer Halle Gate (the north gate)

where an earth rampart had been put up, pierced for four guns.[61] The Ranstadt Gate, leading to the causeway to Lindenau, was near the northwest corner of Leipzig, so if the Allies broke in through the outer Halle Gate, they would be close to blocking the key, western exit route of the French. The outer Halle Gate itself (just south of the bridge over the Parthe) was held by a company of Badeners, with companies each holding the houses on either side. So how was this small force supposed to hold off the 25,000 strong Army of Silesia? The answer is that the French were able to use their interior lines of communication to rush possibly two divisions to this critical point before the Russian attack hit home. All sources agree that Pacthod's Young Guard Division was sent by Napoleon from the south of Leipzig, through the city to the north side, where the 18 guns of its three batteries were deployed in the Rosenthal gardens.[62]

This was the largely marshy area just northwest of Leipzig between the Pleisse and the Elster (Map 6). From here, behind the safety of the Pleisse, they were able to cover the approaches to Pfaffendorf. Only Nafziger says that Brayer's division (of Souham's corps) reinforced Pfaffendorf at 11:00 a.m. and took up a position on the plain to the right of Pfaffendorf (north of the Parthe, in front of the Halle suburb), where it deployed its artillery.[63] This rings true because there are reports of strong French artillery fire from the direction of the Halle suburb as well as Rosenthal and neither the Leipzig garrison nor the Poles had much artillery. On the other hand, it seems counterintuitive that one would choose to defend on the far side of a river, but the position of the Halle suburb and marshy areas by the Parthe may have precluded other good artillery positions.

All commentators state that Souham's corps started in reserve behind Marmont, so Brayer's likely route would have been to pass through one of the eastern outer gates of Leipzig (probably the Hintertor gate), march along the esplanade (outside of the inner wall of the city) and then out through the outer Halle Gate. These marches

would have been possible because they were undertaken before Leipzig became clogged up with retreating forces.

It is now easy to understand why the first Russian attack on Pfaffendorf failed. The Russians appeared to withdraw and at noon Ney felt the area was safe enough to send half of Brayer's division back to Souham in reserve, but keeping the artillery in place. However, Neverovsky was just regrouping and his second attack was supported by Lieven's division and it was probably this attack that reached the outer Halle gate. The Baden defenders made a sortie to stop the Russians breaking down the gate.[64] This attack was so convincingly broken, mainly by artillery fire, that the French were emboldened to advance and a Young Guard battalion threatened to take Gohlis. Sacken was worried enough to ask for help from Yorck who was in reserve in the rear. Yorck sent forward four Prussian battalions who secured Gohlis and repulsed the Young Guard battalion.

At 3:00 p.m. the Russians made another concerted attack but it met with the same result. After this there was just minor skirmishing which petered out as darkness fell. The attack had failed and Neverovsky, veteran of Smolensk and Borodino, was dead.

Towards evening, Blucher heard that the French were retreating west towards the Saale and at 8:00 p.m. he ordered Yorck's corps, including its reserve cavalry, to cover the crossings over the Saale at Halle and Merseburg.[65] They must have marched all night to arrive there at 7:00 a.m., but the French were using crossings further south.

## 6th Column – Gyulai

On the morning of the 18th, Napoleon confirmed to Bertrand that he could begin his march to the Saale. No doubt some would have remembered that it was on 18 October 1812 that Napoleon had issued orders for the retreat from Moscow.

Gyulai was ill-prepared to block him, which must be partly due to his marching and counter-marching the previous day; Crenneville's division was still on its way back from across the Elster. The bulk of Gyulai's force had bivouacked around Gross Zschocher while a battalion garrisoned Klein Zschocher further north and detachments watched the road to Weissenfels.

At 10:00 a.m. Bertrand sent a small force of infantry and cavalry to attack Klein Zschocher where the garrison was taken by surprise and pushed east to the Elster. With no escape route, they surrendered. Gyulai had sent a battalion north to support them but they too broke and half were captured. Bertrand posted cavalry to keep Gyulai pinned in the south while he marched off with his main body. Gyulai's detachments on the Weissenfels road were cut off and made their escape across the Luppe and Rosenthal swamps as best they could. Gyulai pulled back, leaving a small force to observe.

Towards evening, Gyulai received word from Schwarzenberg that the French would probably fall back towards Naumburg (to the southwest) and that he was to try to block the bridge at Kosen (over the Saale near Naumburg). Meerveldt and the entire Austrian cavalry was to follow in the morning.[66] Gyulai reached Kosen on 21 October and held it against some of Bertrand's troops. This was good going because Bertrand had a head start, arriving at Lützen at midnight on the 18th. However, the primary intended crossing point of the French was Weissenfels, further north, where Gyulai had left a detachment

earlier in the campaign. That detachment was too weak to hold Bertrand so they destroyed the bridge and retired.

Napoleon ordered a systematic retreat to begin at 11:00 a.m., initially with the trains and non- combatants such as his headquarters' baggage which included the treasury and the maps of the army. At 4:00 p.m. much of the cavalry was withdrawn to Lindenau: I, III and V cavalry corps (Latour-Maubourg, Arrighi and Pajol) and was followed by the artillery park after it had replenished the ammunition at the front. Empty wagons that lacked horses were destroyed. Napoleon also ordered the following formations to retreat, starting before daybreak on the 19th, in this order: the Old Guard (less Rothembourg's brigade), Oudinot's Young Guard Corps, IV Cavalry Corps (Sokolnicki), IX Corps (Augereau), II Corps (Victor), II Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani). The remainder were to cover the retreat.[67] The Polish patriot, Prince Poniatowski, was made a Marshal of the Empire, an honour he did not greatly esteem, seeing it as an unnecessary attempt to secure his loyalty.

## The Outcome of 18 October

The French had put up an aggressive defence and fought off the Allied attacks in the north and south. In the east they had come close to breaking on several occasions but each time had performed a skilful withdrawal to form a new line. In the west, they had made a successful breakthrough and secured a line of retreat. Despite the defections of some of the German troops, they did not behave like a defeated army and had shown themselves still capable of causing the Allies a fright. The Allies were slow to start in places but had achieved some coordination in making a concerted attack in all sectors except for Lindenau, tightening their grip on Leipzig. Their failure to cut off the western line of retreat is discussed later.




[Map 6: City of Leipzig]

# 5

## The Battle of Leipzig, 19 October 1813

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The orders for 19 October, issued by Schwarzenberg on the previous evening, were simply to continue the Allies' concentric attacks. No serious attempt was made to block Napoleon's western escape route.

The French commenced their withdrawal at 2:00 a.m., leaving rearguards in the positions they had held at the end of 18 October. Those scheduled to retreat to Lindenau commenced their journey through Leipzig and over the causeway, both of which now became congested. Most of the remainder pulled back to the outer suburbs of Leipzig, mist and darkness concealing these movements from the Allies until 5:00 a.m.

The French dispositions were as follows: Reynier's remaining division (Durette's French) and some of the Leipzig garrison held Pfaffendorf and the Halle suburb; Marmont and one of Souham's divisions held the northern section of the Parthe, round to the Grimma Gate; the rest of Souham's corps were to Marmont's right; MacDonalds' XI Corps were next, round to the Windmill Gate in the southeast corner of the outer suburbs, but also keeping two divisions in reserve; Poniatowski and Rothembourg's brigade of the Old Guard took the remaining section up to the Pleisse. Rothembourg's brigade consisted of the Polish Guard battalion and the Westphalian Guard battalion (Napoleon had released the Saxon Guard to guard their

King) which gives credence to the earlier view of the Saxon defectors that Napoleon would sacrifice the foreign troops to save the French. The inner part of the city (within the city walls) was held by two Baden and one Italian battalions of the Leipzig garrison, with the Italians occupying the theatre (by the Ranstadt gate) and the Badeners covering the other gates. The commander of the Baden brigade of the garrison, von Hochberg, took over as garrison commander.

Macdonald was given overall command of the rearguard and was expected to hold Leipzig for another day, releasing formations to retreat as circumstances allowed. The defence was compact (Petre estimates four to five men per pace of the outer perimeter) but hastily put together.

The Allies commenced their advance between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. It took until 10:00 a.m. until they had reached the outer suburbs, having driven the outposts and cleared a few villages, such as Reudnitz. At this point the Czar ordered a pause in the attack to accept a delegation of civilian officials sent from the city to negotiate, an action Napoleon had encouraged to buy time. The Czar and the King of Prussia seemed amenable to letting the French go, in order to spare the city, but the Emperor of Austria was less accommodating and nothing came of it; the attack resumed at 10:30 a.m.

Napoleon crossed the causeway to Lindenau at 11:00 a.m. amidst growing disorder but not panic, as the Allies were still well away from the causeway.

In the northern sector, Blucher made his main attack with Langeron’s corps (now back under his command) assaulting the Halle suburb across the Parthe, with Sacken’s corps making a secondary attack on

his right where Durette's French put up stiff resistance in Pfaffendorf, before falling back over the Parthe. The river proved to be impractical to attack over and Langeron's men stormed the bridge to the Halle Gate but failed to make headway, suffering heavy casualties. It was only after the city defences in the east were breached and the French were forced to start pulling back from the north for fear of being cut off, that the Allies were able to cross from the north. Those defenders trapped inside the Halle suburb fought to the death.

Bulow's Prussians were the first to assault on the eastern sector, attacking the Hintertor gate, held by Freidrichs' division of Marmont's corps and down to the outer Grimma Gate. They were soon joined on their left by Bennigsen's Russians. The outer Grimma Gate and suburb were strongly defended by Marchand's Hessian/Baden division of MacDonald's corps. There was a battery placed outside the gate and the gate itself was barred, barricaded and set with anti-scaling spikes. A battalion was placed in each of the houses on either side of the gate and the adjoining city wall was loopholed. Inside the gate there was a large open square, the Johannisplatz, with the Johannis Church and churchyard on one side. Six battalions were formed up in this space and the church garrisoned.[68] This may have been overkill because the whole outer perimeter was vulnerable in that the outer walls were made of brick, clay and in some places, planks and could be broken through.[69] Some distance from the outer Grimma Gate, the Prussians found a postern (pedestrian gate) which they broke through with axes and then made their way up to attack the houses adjoining the outer Grimma Gate. The Prussians attacking the latter gate lacked axes but managed to make a hole in the wall nearby and got through singly. In addition to the main gate there were pedestrian gates to either side which the Prussians appeared to have broken down. Bennigsen's sappers had also made a hole in the wall south of the outer Grimma Gate. By around 11:00 a.m. the Allies were in the esplanade (the open area that ran around the outside of the inner wall) and many of the defenders of the outer area sought to enter the inner city. Nevertheless, there was substantial fighting in the Johannisplatz and church. A small squadron

of French cuirassiers and some Baden infantry even made a sortie from the inner city to try to retake the outer gate, but were eventually shot down.

Once the Prussians had taken the outer Grimma Gate, the Swedes finally became involved in the combat. To what extent is disputed: some sources say the force was no more than two battalions, others say several regiments were involved. The likely explanation is that the light companies of several battalions were involved (at least some are described as rifle armed). They were certainly accompanied by two Swedish guns which performed well in the fight in the Johannisplatz.

In the southeast section (around the Windmill gate) and south (around the Peterstor Gate, defended by Poniatowski), Bennigsen's Russians and Klenau's Austrians had an easier time. Here, the wall was less intact than elsewhere and after breaking through the wall in one place in the southeast (MacDonald's corps' sector) the attackers found no defenders at all. They then worked their way around the esplanade in both directions.

Back in the east, at the inner Grimma Gate the Baden defenders obeyed orders and refused to open the gate to French and Hessian troops stuck outside. Many were cut down before Hessian pioneers broke through the rotting gates with axes, to allow a mob of fugitives in. The Badeners succeeded in reclosing and barricading the gate. Prince Emile of Hesse claimed that the citizens of Leipzig then opened the gates,[70] but this seems unlikely in the middle of a battle. It seems more likely that the Prussians forced their way through an already weakened gate. It is also possible that Allied artillery was brought up to help. Once the gate had fallen, the Hessians

surrendered, allowing Bulow's men to push westwards through the city.

About 12:30 p.m. there was a tremendous explosion, louder than the regular noise of artillery. The mine under one of the bridges to Lindenau had been blown with French troops still on it and stranding the rearguard. It must have reminded Napoleon of the nightmare crossing of the Berezina the previous year. Who was responsible for this premature demolition? Napoleon had given the responsibility for demolishing the bridge to the commander of the reserve artillery of the Guard, General Dulauloy. The order was to blow the bridge once the last unit was safely across, or if the enemy was about to take the bridge. Dulauloy delegated the task to Colonel Montfort who was second in command of the engineers (the chief engineer, General Rogniat, had accompanied Bertrand to the Saale). Montfort left the bridge, leaving sapper Corporal Lafontaine in charge. When some of Sacken's skirmishers managed to get across to the meadows north of the causeway and began firing at the troops on the bridge, this minor threat caused Corporal Lafontaine to panic and blow the bridge. Chandler suggests that Montfort deserted his post through cowardice. In fact, Montfort wanted to know which was to be the last French formation to leave and sent messengers to find out, but still unable to obtain the information, he decided to go himself and ask Berthier, who was in Lindenau. He was then unable to get back to the bridge because of the press of people on the causeway.

After the explosion, disorder turned to chaos amongst those queueing for the bridge. It was now every man for himself: some fought on, some surrendered and some tried to swim to safety, many of whom drowned. MacDonald succeeded in swimming across, but Poniatowski, who was wounded, drowned attempting to swim across on his horse. The problem was not just the swift flow of the water but the steep, muddy banks made it very difficult to get out of the river. Some troops passed further up the Elster and managed to find a

place where it was possible to wade across. Marmont was already across before the explosion and his artillery continued to bombard the Allies from the Lindenau side of the river.

Around 15,000 defenders were trapped by the premature demolition (sources are consistent on this) plus about 15,000 sick and wounded. It should be remembered that Leipzig's hospitals were nursing sick and wounded even before the battle. 15,000 combatants appears modest but is reasonable given that Marmont's corps had already crossed the causeway and at least parts of MacDonald's corps and Durette's division escaped.

Once most of the fighting had subsided, the Czar and King of Prussia processed at the head of their guards to the market square, where they were joined by Bernadotte and Blucher.

## The Result

Losses for the 19th quoted by Smith were 6,000 dead and wounded for the French, against 7,000 for the Allies.[71] The latter number reflects the heavy casualties suffered by Sacken and Langeron in the north, which were largely fruitless enterprises, but the total for the Allies was relatively light considering they were attacking a heavily defended walled city.

The overall result for the whole battle is estimated as follows:

French:

| | |
|---|---|
| Killed and wounded | 40,000 |
| Captured on the 19th | 15,000 |
| Sick and wounded in hospital | 15,000 |
| German allies deserted | 5,000 |
| Total | 75,000 |

Allies:

| | |
|---|---|
| Killed and wounded | 56,000 |

See Appendix III for sources and discussion.

Furthermore, the French abandoned a large amount of materiel: about 325 guns, 900 ammunition wagons – in addition to the wagons burnt before the retreat – and thousands of muskets. Napoleon also lost prestige, having been defeated in person by the allied generals, although the British General Wilson, attached to the Army of Bohemia, thought this was overstated. He wrote that Napoleon, 'baffled us in both day's previous combats [16th and 18th] … Had the enemy not wanted provisions, I even doubt whether he would have retired so precipitately'.[72]

## The Aftermath

With Leipzig in chaos and the bridge blown, the Allied pursuit was initially left to those troops dispatched earlier, although their engineers worked all night to make or repair bridges. Even this limited pursuit captured about four thousand French stragglers over the next few days and also liberated three to four thousand Allied prisoners.

Bertrand's corps reached Weissenfels to find the bridge over the Saale broken, but Napoleon's decision to send his Chief Engineer, General Rogniat, with Bertrand proved wise and they were able to repair the bridge and set about building more. Bertrand was also to secure other crossings but Gyulai had reached the bridge at Kosen first (on the 21st) and held it against Bertrand's detachment. Nevertheless, the French army got across the Saale and reached the

supply depot at Erfurt where it was able to re-equip. Despite this, Napoleon did not stay here long and continued his retreat to the Rhine, having to fight his way through the Bavarians on the way at the Battle of Hanau on 30 October.

Back in Leipzig, the misfortunes of its citizens and the wounded did not end. The hospitals were in a deplorable state and the presence of hordes of soldiers and their horses made conditions unsanitary, which lead to a major outbreak of typhus. Many soldiers and civilians died.

The meeting of the Allied Monarchs on the Grand Square
after the ever memorable BATTLE of LEIPSIC Oct.8th 1813.
Entrevue des Souverains Alliés à la Place Grande
après la BATAILLE à jamais mémorable de LEIPSIC Oct.8 1813.

The meeting of the allied monarchs in the Grand Square after the Battle of Leipzig depicting, from left to right, Czar Alexander (in the centre on the white horse), Platov (in red coat), the Crown Prince of Sweden, Schwarzenberg (hatless), Emperor Francis of Austria, Blucher, King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia and Sir Charles Stewart. Drawn and etched by L. M. Wright (Hassell & Richards, London 1814). Reproduced by permission of the British Library (© The British Library Board: O Maps K.Top.97.56.2).

The King of Saxony was arrested and taken to Berlin, while Saxony was placed under the administration of a Russian General. Saxony was out of the war. A few days after the battle, the Duchy of Württemberg officially defected to the Allies and the other remaining states of the Confederation of the Rhine soon followed. Even Murat had a secret meeting with the Austrians on the 22nd to discuss the possibility of changing sides and keeping his kingdom of Naples.

Germany was still not entirely free. General Wilson feared that St. Cyr might break out from Dresden with his 50,000 garrison and attempt to join up with Davout's substantial force in Hamburg, putting another large French army in the field. He need not have worried because St. Cyr surrendered on 11 November. Several other garrisons in fortresses in Germany and Poland also fell into Allied hands, including Modlin (on the Vistula) and Zamosc (in southeast Poland) which fell in the winter of 1813. Hamburg, Magdeburg, Mainz and Wesel held out until the end of the war.

French light infantry in line. (Mark Freeth, The Wargames Holiday Centre)

# 6

## Analysis of the Historical Battle

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As Commander in Chief, Schwarzenberg must take some of the credit for co-ordinating the Allied armies to create a situation reminiscent of Napoleon's Ulm manoeuvre of 1805, whereby an Austrian army was induced to surrender after being surrounded by superior forces. However, he could not have achieved this without the agreement and determination of the Czar and Blucher. His conduct in the battle was potentially inept and the Allies won despite him. The Allies were saved from his initial plan, which was to channel large forces down the funnel between the Pleisse and the Elster, by the intervention of the Russian high command, including the Czar. His continued obsession with this sector is demonstrated by the fact that he positioned himself with Meerveldt on the morning of 16 October and placed the Austrian reserves, under Hessen-Homberg, behind him on the west side of the Pleisse. He was over-reliant on the advice of his Quartermaster General, von Langenau who had previously been Chief of Staff of the Saxon army and assumed that Langenau, as a Saxon, knew the terrain well. At one point Schwarzenberg was reduced to asking the local vicar for directions to Connewitz. It is possible that this locality and fording the Pleisse would have been more practicable if there had been less rain.

The Russo-Prussian reserves were placed too far back to support the attack. Both these and Hessen-Homburg's formations were able to get into action only just in time, partly due to the intervention of the

Czar to move them before the crisis and partly by luck in that the French advanced towards them.

After Klenau's Austrians had taken the Kolberg on 16 October, he was reinforced by Pahlen's Russian cavalry just in time to confront MacDonald and Sebastiani. This was not luck this time, but was down to the foresight of Klenau to ask for reinforcements when he saw what was approaching and Pahlen's generosity in sending the greater part of his command.

The Allies failed to block Napoleon's eventual escape route. Although Schwarzenberg was expecting Blucher to send St. Priest's corps to the Lindenau sector on 16 October, it should have become apparent that this was not happening. There were opportunities to reinforce Gyulai during the lull of 17 October, or later, but Schwarzenberg chose not to strengthen this sector. Even if St. Priest had arrived, the intention was for Gyulai to then move into the Elster/Pleisse funnel. There was a risk that if the Allies strengthened the Lindenau sector, weakening other sectors, Napoleon might have broken out elsewhere (a strategy that could be tested in a wargame), but Schwarzenberg's motivation may have been that he was content for the French to quit Leipzig. Some years later he commented that, 'We did not have sufficient troops to hold all possible exits in strength. Anyway, it is not always advisable to drive an enemy, who is still strong, to desperate measures'.[73] The Allied command was still in awe of Napoleon and did not expect him to meekly surrender like General Mack at Ulm. They had taken heavy casualties and the prospect of an even more prolonged battle for a fortified city may not have been palatable. The Allies were probably aware from prisoners of their enemy's lack of food, but they may not have known the extent of Napoleon's ammunition shortage (Chandler says the French were down to 20,000 artillery rounds on the 19th, having fired 200,000 during the whole battle).

Bernadotte has come in for much criticism for always lagging behind. General Wilson was the only one who sympathised with him, writing, ‘The sacrifice of his communications with Sweden is too much to require of him … may affect his Royal interests and security’. The latter point is that Crown Prince Bernadotte had not fully secured his crown, which would be jeopardised by a defeat or the Swedish contingent taking heavy casualties. Wilson did not think the Swedish corps could win a battle.[74] Bernadotte’s political objective was to do enough to secure Sweden’s place at the negotiating table after the war, where he hoped to add Norway to his kingdom, but not suffer too much to risk his crown. Another possible reason for Bernadotte’s behaviour is suggested by an intriguing comment made by Colonel Cooke (adjutant to General Stewart) recorded in Wilson’s journal in August. Cooke said, ‘If anything happens to Buonaparte the French people would select him [Bernadotte] or Moreau as their chief ’. Could it be that Bernadotte had ambitions in this direction and did not want to alienate the French people by fighting France too vigorously? [75] Moreau incidentally, who had been an important French general during the Revolutionary period, was then serving as a military adviser to the Czar. He died in September 1813 after losing a leg at the battle of Dresden.

Napoleon’s strategic plan and battle plans were by no means foolish, given the limited information that he had. There is no denying however, that he became surrounded by a larger force and lost the battle and mistakes were made.

If Napoleon was going to win the battle, it would have to be on 16 October, before the arrival of Bennigsen and Colloredo. He would have had to have made a vigorous attack with all the forces he had available, but in the event some of his divisions were not fully engaged. Napoleon’s stubborn refusal to believe Marmont’s reports

that he was facing a large enemy formation led to Souham's corps spending most of 16 October marching and countermarching between sectors and only one of III Corps' two divisions was engaged towards the end of the day.

Chandler criticised Ney for his 'extravagance' in sending the whole of Bertrand's corps to defend Lindenau, thus depriving the southern sector of troops. This is unfair because Bertrand's corps was quite small and he must have detached Franquemont's Württemberg division (of only brigade strength) in Leipzig because it was there to cover Marmont's retreat and by the end of 16 October, Bertrand was asking for reinforcements. It was a reasonable force to allocate if the west road was to be kept open. An alternative strategy could have been not to defend Lindenau at all. The causeway and five sequential bridges could have been defended by a brigade and some artillery. This would have meant ceding the westward escape route and gambling everything on a victory or breakout in another direction, but it would have freed up Bertrand's corps on 16 October, and Bertrand plus two Young Guard divisions on the 18th. If the Allies had reinforced Gyulai, their western force would have been unengaged. These are decisions for wargaming commanders to ponder.

A fairer criticism could be made of MacDonald for his performance on 16 October. His role in the main French attack, which was in the southern sector, was to perform a left hook, outflanking the enemy right. In practice he sent Gerard's division to Klein Posna to cover his flank and kept Marchand's division in reserve all day, thus half his corps was not engaged. The only threat to his flank appears to have been Platov's Cossacks, who could have been covered by some cavalry. If Sebastiani's cavalry was not sufficient, he could have asked for reinforcements as Klenau had done. The French were in a dangerous position strategically. This was not the time for caution, but for bold action.

Napoleon missed some opportunities. Firstly, when Gorchakov's attack was repulsed early on 16 October, he could have counter-attacked then before the Allied reserves had come up. He may have been waiting for MacDonald and Sebastiani to get in to position, or he may have lacked intelligence on the whereabouts of the Allied reserves. Secondly, when Bordessoulle's cuirassiers broke through the Allies in the afternoon and almost reached the Czar, the French could have reinforced him, but Napoleon had left the Galgenberg by then and was not present to exploit the situation personally.

Prussians clash with the French. (Mark Freeth, The Wargames Holiday Centre)

Overall, the French failed to break the Allies in the southern sector on 16 October, but did well enough to gain ground which bought them time on the 18th. It should have become apparent to Napoleon that his opportunity to defeat the Allies had passed and that he should

withdraw. His inactivity on 17 October is inexplicable. Perhaps he was clinging on to the vain hope that the Allies would accept an armistice. Perhaps he hoped that the Allies had taken enough of a battering to retire. If he had ordered the retreat earlier, the rearguard would certainly have been under less pressure because Bennigsen's army would not have been fully available and Bernadotte's Army of the North may have been hanging back.

In later years, Napoleon claimed that his defeat was largely due to the treachery of the Saxons turning their guns on the French. Total defections amounted to about 5,000 which is a relatively small number of troops, although it may have had a more significant effect on morale. Very few of these took part in the battle after defecting.

The premature explosion of the bridge was tragic and dramatic but not of huge strategic significance. The wounded in the hospitals would have been left behind anyway. Of the c.15,000 combatants stranded, many were German and their states were soon to change sides. Although the timing is uncertain, the Allies had already broken through into the inner city when the mine blew, so some of the defenders would have been cut off in any case. If Napoleon had arranged for more temporary bridges to be built, that would have helped. Some commentators say that a foot bridge across to the 'Richter Garten' had been raised but it collapsed under the weight of troops. The Richter Garten was on the west side of the Pleisse, south of the causeway, from where people would still have to cross the Elster to escape. This is where Poniatowski drowned.

With the benefit of hindsight, Napoleon's biggest error was to leave St. Cyr in Dresden. If he had kept to his initial decision of 6 October, he could have had an extra 51,000 men at Leipzig, or could have had St. Cyr block Bennigsen's Army of Poland, say on the River Mulde.

When Napoleon evacuated Moscow in 1812, he gave his army two days warning. Assuming he would have done the same in Dresden, St. Cyr could have marched on 8 October. Dresden is about 70 miles from Leipzig, so it is reasonable to assume that he could have reached Leipzig by 13 or 14 October. Bennigsen, marching via Dresden, only reached Colditz on the Mulde on 16 October and his cavalry patrols did not contact the Army of Bohemia until 17 October. On the other hand, if St. Cyr had quit Dresden, Bennigsen would not have had to detach troops to help blockade it.

# Part II

## 7

# Introduction to Wargaming the Battle

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### Terrain

The game maps, A, B and C join together to form one stylised map of the whole battlefield. If using 25mm figures, three square feet (or one m²) of playing area is recommended for each square. If using 15mm figures, two square feet (60cm²) is recommended. The scenarios below use segments of this map.

The villages have the capacity to hold one standard-sized battalion. They are considered ‘fortified’, in that the defenders would have had time to prepare defences. Probstheida has an additional garden wall on two sides.

The small black squares on the map are isolated buildings which can hold a company of skirmishers, except for Connewitz (map ref. D3) which can hold two companies.

All of the woods marked on the map are dense woods, impassable to cavalry and artillery. You can add a few open woods/orchards in outlying areas for visual effect, but not to block the vicinity of Leipzig or the main areas or fighting.

The hills are all gentle. They block line of sight but are not high enough to allow overhead firing. The hill at H4 has an enclosure, representing the sheep pens of Heiterer Blick farm (hedges or fences can be used).

Rivers and bridges– Napoleon had ordered a number of bridges to be destroyed, but the ones on the map are still intact. The River Parthe is fordable to infantry and cavalry (half speed, unforming and no doubling or charging when crossing) but impassable to artillery except at the bridges. The Elster and Pleisse are impassable in the area of the battlefield except by the bridges (which start off in French hands). For the Allies to redeploy across these rivers requires wide flank marches off table, for which instructions are given in the Allied briefing below. The road from Leipzig to Lindenau crosses the rivers by a causeway.

Marshes – Marshes are generally impassable to artillery and cavalry. Infantry move at half speed and are unformed when in a marsh. The area between the rivers Luppe and Elster (row 5) is impassable to all troops, except that there is enough dry land to deploy a battery to the west of Pfaffendorf and east of Lindenau (see the small road leading off the causeway between the bridges, D4).

Austrian infantry form square while the cavalry prepares to charge. (Chris Robinson)

In addition to the marshes, the whole of the area between the Elster and Pleisse west of Mark-Kleeberg (largely comprising squares C2 and D2) is difficult terrain and no tactical/forced marches or doubling is allowed, unless charging to contact.

Leipzig city – The city has a small outer wall, similar to that of a walled garden and a medieval style inner wall, with a small open area in between. The inner wall is impassable except by the gates and the area within is built up. Where the map shows a road reaching the city, there are large gates in the walls. In addition to the four large gates of the inner wall, add three small, postern gates (on the north, east and west sides).


7
6
5
4
3
2
1
A
B
C
D
Breitenfeld
Lindenthal
Möckern
R. Eltster
R. Luppe
Lindenau
Klein Zschocker
Connewitz
(12 SK)
Markranstadt
R. Eltster

Map 7: Game Map A: West


to Düben
Mockau
R. Parthe
Eutritzsch
Schonefeld
Pfaffendorf
Halle
Sub.
Reudnitz
LEIPZIG
Probstheida
Dolitz
Wachau
Galgenberg
Liebertwolkwitz
Mark-Kleeberg
R. Pliesse
Crostewitz
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
E
F
G
H

Map 8: Game Map B: Centre


7
6
5
4
3
2
1
I
J
K
Taucha
Kolmberg
Fuchshain
Gross Posna

Map 9: Game Map C: East

## Introduction to the scenarios

If you are playing the small scenarios as discrete battles, use the recommended orders of battle and deployment instructions given below. There is some repetition in the briefings in order to make each briefing complete, but the detailed orders of battle are not repeated. Ideally, the players should only see the briefings and orders of battle of their own sides. References to ‘The French’, include their allies.

If you are playing a mini campaign or the whole of the main battle (16 to 18 October), then the commanders have some more strategic choices to make. Most of the French started in and around Leipzig, so Napoleon can choose which sector to place his troops in. For example, Marmont’s corps historically fought in the northern sector and Victor’s corps in the south. In the game, Napoleon can select which sector to place his starting forces. The French reinforcements will arrive as they did historically. The Allies have less choice because their armies were approaching from different directions, thus it would be unreasonable to have Bernadotte’s Army of the North (which approached from the north), arriving in the southern sector. However, commanders have discretion of where they place their divisions within their sector.

Before the game, you may pick and choose from the optional ‘House Rules’ listed in Appendix I.

The order of battle for the whole of the main battle is designed for about 12 players for a two-day game. If you have fewer players, scale down the forces proportionately. The orders of battle for the smaller scenarios are simply subsets of the main one. Unit sizes are for ‘In The Grand Manner’(ITGM) rules. See Chapter 9 ‘Design Notes’ on how to adapt these for other rule sets.

Cavalry Commanders add 1 to the morale of any cavalry in their corps within 12 inches. Cavalry sub-generals add 1 to the morale of their squadrons that they are attached to.

## Guidance for Running a Mini Campaign

You do not necessarily need the same group of players for each battle because historically, there were different commanders for different sectors. However, it is useful to have two consistently involved players to take the roles of Napoleon and Schwarzenberg, because they will be making strategic decisions.

You may start with any sector for the battle on 16 October, but play the other sectors’ fights of 16 October before returning to the first sector for the fight on 18 October. This is because the French can react by redeploying some forces between sectors during the lull of 17 October. Record the areas of ground held at the end of 16 October (taking photos helps).

Most wargame rules work with standard-sized battalions and squadrons. It is best to aggregate casualties within a corps at the end of a day's fighting; round the result to a whole number of units of similar status and start the next day with the reduced number of full-strength battalions/squadrons. If skirmishers are treated as separate units, it is simplest to ignore their casualties and to give the adjusted corps a new number of skirmish units, based say on two skirmish figures per battalion, rounded to full companies.

# 8

# The Scenarios

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## Scenario A

## Liebertwolkwitz 14 October

Murat's right, from Mark-Kleeberg up to and including Wachau, was held by Poniatowski, Sokolnicki and Victor. Although engaged, nothing significant happened in this area and therefore it is excluded from this scenario and the game is restricted to columns G, H and I, rows 1 and 2. If you have room, you can add further rows behind either side. Wachau can be represented on the edge of the table for aesthetic purposes if you wish, but should be treated as out of bounds to both sides. The scenario excludes those units of the Allies that were engaged against the Poles and Victor.

French briefing

Order of battle:

Marshal Murat – Cavalry Commander for this scenario only.

V Corps: General Lauriston (see full order of battle below for details)

V Cavalry Corps

One light cavalry regiment (four squadrons) from I Cavalry Corps

Deployment: the French can deploy up to and including the hill on G2 (Galgenberg), Liebertwolkwitz (H2) and then angling back towards the Kolmberg heights (I2).

Possible reinforcements: Murat can call up Mortier's Young Guard corps by sending an order saying on which board they will appear (north side). They will arrive two turns later.

Allied Briefing

Order of battle and deployment:

Pahlen starts 12 inches into the southern edge of the table to the west of the wood with one Russian uhlan regiment.

Klenau’s Austrian infantry and artillery march onto the table on the first turn, to the east of the wood.

Kleist’s Prussian uhlan regiment arrives on turn two, opposite Liebertwolkwitz.

Kleist’s two squadrons of Prussian cuirassiers arrive on turn three, opposite Liebertwolkwitz.

Klenau’s two regiments of Austrian cavalry arrive on turn four, to the east of the wood.

French horse battery in action. (Chris Robinson)

Objectives and Victory Conditions

Murat's objective is simply to hold the ground he starts with and the Allied objective is to take it. If Murat is compelled to call up reinforcements and they become engaged, the Allies can claim a moral victory because they would have achieved more than they did historically.

## Scenario B

## The Whole of the Main Battle 16 to 18 October

You have the choice of playing Liebertwolkwitz first, as a separate battle, or ignoring it and going straight into the main battle. If you do the former, you will need to adjust the order of battle for casualties suffered and possibly adjust the starting positions for 16 October.

The game for the whole battle is designed for two days of play, representing 16 and 18 October. There is assumed to be no fighting on 17 October for the historical reasons discussed above.

French Briefing

Leaders:

Marshals Ney and Murat are commanders for their respective wings. Ney commands the northern wing, including the Lindenau/Leipzig garrison. Murat (who is not a cavalry commander in this scenario) commands the south. Some of the larger corps have named divisional commanders as well as corps commanders, so it is possible to have 3 commanders combining to affect morale. All commanders have an influence of +1 on morale with a 12-inch range. Napoleon has no effect on combat morale but should be played by a player to take strategic decisions. He can, however, influence the rallying of retreating and routing troops in the rear.

Cossacks harass Delmas' baggage train. (Geoff Eyles)

*Deployment*

The Leipzig garrison must start in Leipzig or Lindenau (map ref. C4). It may place in its deployment area, one fleche (mini redoubt) capable of holding one battery. This can be placed as a card, to be revealed to the opponents once the battle starts and if in visibility range.

Sebastiani's II Cavalry Corps and MacDonald's XI Corps, having arrived the previous day, start in and around Taucha (I5).

The other formations, except for reinforcements, can be deployed as the Emperor wishes within the following deployment area:

a) North: from Mockern (C5) to Eutritzsch to Mochau. Skirmish outposts may be placed in the isolated buildings in C6 and E6.

b) West: no further west than Lindenau (C4) except that a skirmisher outpost can be placed in the isolated building at C3, representing the small village of Klein Zschocher.

c) South: from Leipzig, south along the east bank of the River Pleisse as far as Mark-Kleeberg, then east through Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz, then northeast as far as the Kolmberg heights.

*Reinforcements*

Delmas' division of III Corps will arrive on 16 October on the Duben road (F7) on a dice throw of 14 (throw three average dice and add the game turn number – see Design Notes for explanation). It arrives in column of march on the road, although the cavalry can flank it. There will be a penalty if Delmas' important baggage train does not get to Leipzig.

Reynier's VII Corps will arrive automatically at Taucha (I5) the end of 16 October unless Leipzig is completely cut off from the north and northeast, in which case it will have to fight its way on at the beginning of the 18th from the road on H7.

**French Order of Battle for Game**

**Whole Battle of Leipzig**

| | | | | Infantry Btns. | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C-in-C: The Emperor Napoleon** | | | | | | | |
| Wing Commanders: Marshal Ney (north); Marshal Murat (South) | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **Old Guard - Friant** | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 40 Old Guard | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Old Guard | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Westphalian Guard (Elite) | | | | | |
| | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Young Guard Corps - Marshal Oudinot** | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Elite Young Guard | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 Veteran | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr Elite Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **2nd Young Guard Corps - Marshal Mortier** | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Elite Young Guard | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 Veteran | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr Elite Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **Guard Reserve Artillery** | | | | | | |
| | | 12-pdr Elite Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **Guard Cavalry - Nansouty (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 10 Guard Chassuers a Cheval + 10 Mamelukes | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 10 Guard Lancers | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 10 Grenadiers á Cheval | | | 4 | | |
| | | 6-pdr Guard Horse Battery (3 guns) | | | 1 | 3 | |
| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | Infantry Btns. | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **II Corps Marshall Victor** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 skirmishers | | 8 | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **III Corps - Souham** | | | | | | | |
| | **8th/11th Division - Brayer** | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 7 | | | |
| | | 8-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 2 | x 6 Light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **9th Division - Delmas (starts off table)** | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 3 | btns | 1 x 6 skirmishers | 3 | | | |
| | 2 | x 6 Light cavalry (Confederation of the Rhine) | | | 2 | | |
| | 3 | Baggage waggons | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **IV Corps - Bertrand** | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 French 1st class | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 Italian 1st class | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 2nd class (Wurtemburgers) | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **V Corps - Lauriston** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 5 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | 12-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 2 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | Infantry Btns. | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **VI Corps - Marshal Marmont** | | | | | | | |
| | **20th Division - Compans** | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 4 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 4 | | | |
| | | 12-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 2 | x 6 Light cavalry (Confederation of the Rhine) | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **21st/22nd Divs - Lagrange** | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 skirmishers | 8 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 4 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **VII Corps - Reynier (Reinforcements)** | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 1st class French | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 2nd class Saxons | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | Horse battery (3 guns) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | 4 | x 6 Saxon light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **VIII Corps - Prince Poniatowski** | | | | | | | |
| | 5 | x 36 Veterans | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **IX Corps - Augereau** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **XI Corps - Macdonald** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 1st class French | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 2nd class Westphalians | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 2nd class Italians | | | | | |
| | 10 | btns | 3 x 6 skirmishers | 10 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 2 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | Infantry Btns. | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Leipzig Garrison** - no general but can be put under command of a Corps commander. | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 2nd class | 1 x 6 skirmishers | 3 | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Dragoons (heavy militia) | | | 4 | | |
| | | 8-pdr foot battery (3 guns only) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **1st Cavalry Corps - Latour-Maubourg (Cavalry Commander for this corps only)** | | | | | | | |
| | **1st/2nd/3rd Light Cavalry Divisions - Chastel (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Heavy Cavalry Division** | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Elite Cuirassiers (Saxon Zastro Regt) | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **3rd Heavy Cavalry Division** | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | Horse Battery (3 guns) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **2nd Cavalry Corps - Sebastiani (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **4rd Cavalry Corps (Polish) - Sokolnicki (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Polish light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Polish lancers (line) | | | 4 | | |
| | | Horse Battery (3 guns) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **5th Cavalry Corps - Pajol (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Light Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 91 | 94 | 14 | 51 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | Note: 3rd Cavalry Corps had been divided up between Marmont and Souham. | | | | | | |

*Allied Briefing*

*Leaders: Schwarzenberg, Blucher, Bernadotte and Bennigsen are Commanders in Chief for their respective armies. Some of the larger corps have named divisional commanders as well as corps commanders, so it is possible to have three commanders affecting morale. All commanders have an influence of +1 with a 12-inch range. The monarchs and intermediate generals such as Wittgenstein, Langeron and Constantine have no effect on morale and are not included in the order of battle, but players may wish to assume their characters.*

*Deployment*

Yorck's corps of the Army of Silesia has arrived from the west on the road at A5. It can deploy 12 inches onto board A5, north of the river.

Gyulai's corps starts within 12 inches of Markranstadt (B2).

The rest of the Army of Bohemia (apart from reinforcements) can be deployed halfway across boards C1 and D1 from the south, between the two rivers, eight inches in from the southern table edge from the River Pleisse to Gross Posna and then diagonally as far as Fuchshain (the isolated building in J2).

Gyulai's force can be reinforced from the army of Silesia or the starting forces of the army of Bohemia, but it will take a day to do it

using a wide flank march. If you wish to do this, the designated troops will arrive automatically with Gyulai at the start of the second day's play, but will take no part in the first day.

The Russo-Prussian Guard cannot be committed without the permission of the Czar.

**Allied Reinforcements**

| | Day | Entrance Road | Score required |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Army of Silesia** | | | |
| - St.Priest | 16th | A5, B7 or D7 | 16 |
| - Kapsevich | 16th | D7 | 14 |
| - Sacken | 16th | A5, B7 or D7 | 17 |
| **Army of Bohemia** | | | |
| - Hessen-Homburg | 16th | Either E1 or board D1 | 10 |
| - Yermalov | 16th | E1 | 14 |
| - Colleredo | 16th | H2 | At end of day |
| **Army of the North** | | | |
| - Wintzingerode | 18th | F7 or H7 | 9 |
| - Bulow | 18th | F7 or H7 | 11 |
| - Stedingk | 18th | F7 or H7 | 14 |
| **Army of the Poland** | 18th | K4 and K5 | 10 |

To calculate the score, throw three average dice and add the current game turn.

All reinforcements enter either in column of route on the road or deployed eight inches either side of the road. Where there is a choice of road, players must make that choice before play commences.

There is a pontoon train in the Russian contingent of the Army of Silesia. It takes a full three moves to lay a bridge across a river after arriving there.

Colloredo can start in the line of battle at the beginning of the second day. This will be approximately in the H2 area, depending on how far the Allies have advanced on day one.

French attacking the Prussians. Mamelukes in foreground. (Chris Robinson)

**Allied Order of Battle for Game**

**The Whole Battle of Leipzig 16 to 19 October 1813**

| | | | | | Infantry btns | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Army of the Bohemia - Schwarzenberg** | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Austrian Corps - Colloredo** | | | | | | | |
| | | **Hardegg's Division** | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 1st Class Jaegers | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 6 | x 6 Dragoons | | | 6 | | |
| | | | Horse Battery (3 guns) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | **Greth's Division** | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 1st Class Jaegers | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 48 Grenz | | | | | |
| | | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 7 | | | |
| | | 6 | x 6 Light Cavalry | | | 6 | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **2nd Austrian Corps - Meerveldt** | | | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 3 | x 6 Light Cavalry | | | 3 | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **3rd Austrian Corps - Gyulai** | | | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 48 Grenz | | | | | |
| | | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 6 | x 6 Uhlans | | | 6 | | |
| | | 2 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 2 | | |
| | | | 12-pdr Foot Battery (2 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | Infantry btns | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4th Austrian Corps - Klenau** | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 48 Grenz | | | | | | |
| | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | | 9 | | | |
| | 6 | x 6 Light Cavalry | | | | 6 | | |
| | 6 | x 6 Uhlans | | | | 6 | | |
| | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Austrian Reserve Corps - Hessen-Homberg** | | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Elite Grenadiers | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | | |
| | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | | 9 | | | |
| | 6 | x 6 Cuirassiers | | | | 6 | | |
| | 6 | x 6 Cuirassiers | | | | 6 | | |
| | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (2 guns + howitzer) | | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | 12-pdr foot battery (3 guns) | | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Russian Cavalry Division - Pahlen (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Uhlans | | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | | 4 | | |
| | 3 | x 5 Cossacks | | | | 3 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **1st Russian Corps - Gorchakov** | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | | |
| | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | | 8 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **2nd Russian Corps - Eugen von Wurtemberg** | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | | |
| | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | | 8 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **2nd Prussian Corps - Kleist** | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | | |

| | | | | | Infantry btns | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 10 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 10 | | | |
| | | 2 | x 6 Prussian Cuirassiers | | | 2 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Prussian Uhlans | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Landwehr Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | Horse battery (3 guns) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Russian Grenadier Corps - Rajevsky** | | | | | | | |
| | | 7 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 7 | | | |
| | | | 12-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Russo-Prussian Guard Corps - Yermalov** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 Russian Guard | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Russian Pavlov Grenadiers (Elite) | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Prussian Foot Gards (Elite) | | | | | |
| | | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 8 | | | |
| | | | Half Russian Guard 12-pdr battery (2 guns + 1 licorne) | | | | 0.5 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st/2nd Russian Cavaly Divisions - Rosen (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Guard Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Line Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | | | Russian line horse battery (4 guns) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **3rd/4th Russian & Prussian Cavaly Divisions - Duka (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Russian Guard Hussars | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Russian Line Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Prussian Guard du Corp (Elite Heavies) | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Don Cossacks - Ataman Platov (Cavalry Commander for these regts only)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 5 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 5 | | |
| | | 5 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 5 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Army of Silesia - Blucher** | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Prussian Corps - Yorck** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 5 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 11 | btns | 4 x 6 Skirmishers | 11 | | | |

| | | | | | Infantry btns | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 12-pdr battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | 4 | x 6 Hussars with Gen.Sir Charles Stuart (cavalry sub-general)* | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Landwehr Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **VIII Russian Corps/Advance Guard - St.Priest** | | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 5 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | 5 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 5 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **IX/X Russian Corps - Kapsevich** | | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 8 | | | |
| | | | 12-pdr battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | | 4 | x 8 Light cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | Pontoon train (2 wagons) | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **XI Russian Corps - Sacken** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 7 | | | |
| | | | 6-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Army of the North – Bernadotte** | | | | | | | | |
| | **Wintzingerode's Russian Corps** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 5 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | 5 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 5 | | |
| | | | Russian Horse battery (4 guns) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | Infantry btns | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **3rd Prussian Corps - Bulow** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | | 6-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | 4 | x 6 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Landwehr Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Swedish Corps - Stedingk** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Lifeguard (Elite) | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Vereran Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 7 | | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Militia Heavy Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Light Cavaly | | | 4 | | |
| | | | 6-pdr militia foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | British Rocket troop | | | | 0.2 | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Russian Army of Poland - Bennigsen** | | | | | | | | |
| | | 5 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | | 6-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Uhlans | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Bubna (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 6 | x6 Austrian Light Cavalry | | | 6 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 153 | 174 | 19.7 | 84 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| * | General Sir Charles Stewart was a British ambasador but he pursuaded the Prussians to give him command of the Brandenberg Hussars for the battle. | | | | | | | |

*End of Day Reorganisation*

There is no fighting on 17 October but players can reorganise their forces as follows. Troops who routed on the first day will return provided they had a clear escape route, otherwise they will surrender. Cavalry that routed and did not rally should be left on the table at the rear on the first day.

Survivors of depleted battalions can be transferred to bring other battalions up to full strength provided the fresh battalion is of an equal or lower class, otherwise the fresh battalion will be demoted in class.

The number of skirmish units can be restored using the following formula: two skirmishers per battalion, rounded to the nearest six.

Infantry can clean their muskets, thus regaining their bonus for firing their first volley.

Forces can be redeployed to a limited extent. Neither side may gain ground but may voluntarily withdraw to a more defensible position. The Allies cannot at this stage choose to redeploy forces to different sectors, but can shuffle units to the left or right up to two feet, provided that does not involve crossing rivers. The French, with their interior lines of communication, have more scope to redeploy. Napoleon can order up to two divisions to change sector, within ground that the French hold at the end of day one.

French cuirassiers charge. (Chris Robinson)

*Defections*

If you are running the game as an independent umpire, the following rule should not be divulged to the players beforehand. At the beginning of the second day's play, after deployment, roll a d6 for each German unit (battalion, cavalry regiment or battery). The units desert on a roll of one and are taken off the table. This could create some disconcerting gaps.

*Supply*

If Delmas' wagons do not make it through to Leipzig on day one, the French in the northern sector are deemed to be low on ammunition and suffer a minus 1 penalty when firing on day two.

Yorck's Prussians advance on Mockern from the west. (Philip Marshall)

## Scenario C

## Mockern (Northern Sector) 16 to 18 October

You can play just the action of 16 October or continue to the action of 18 October as a second session. See scenario ‘b’ for the permitted reorganisation during the lull of 17 October, possible defections and supply.

Use rows four to seven of the game map. If constrained for space, you can dispense with rows four and seven and columns I to K (I to K will not be required on 16 October anyway). If dispensing with row seven, add two moves to the arrival times of reinforcements coming from the north.

The deployment areas on 16 October will be the same whether you are fighting a standalone scenario or a mini campaign and are the same as those described for the northern sector in Scenario ‘b’ above, but are repeated here for ease of reference.

*Allied Briefing*

Yorck’s corps of the Army of Silesia has arrived from the west on the road at A5. It can deploy 12 inches onto board A5, north of the river. The Allies will be reinforced by the remainder of the Army of Silesia and the Army of the North as per the chart in scenario ‘b’ above. For the detailed order of battle of the relevant corps, see the order of battle for the full battle.

Langeron’s Russians advance on Mockern from the north. (Philip Marshall)

The author looking worried about his defence of Mockern. (Philip Marshall)

*French Briefing*

The starting forces can be deployed within the following area, from Mockern (C5) to Eutritzsch to Mochau (F6). Skirmish outposts may be placed in the isolated buildings in C6 and E6. The starting forces comprise of:

Maréchal Ney (C-in-C)

VI Corps – Marmont

Brayer's division of III Corps – Souham

One battalion of the Leipzig garrison occupies the northern part of the city and cannot leave the city.

Delmas' division of III Corps will arrive on 16 October on the Duben road (F7) on a dice throw of 14 (throw three average dice and add the game turn number). It arrives in column of march on the road, although the cavalry can flank it. There will be a penalty if Delmas' important baggage train does not get to Leipzig.

Reynier's VII Corps will arrive automatically at Taucha (I5) at the end of 16 October unless Leipzig is completely cut off from the north and northeast, in which case it will have to fight its way on at the beginning of 18 October along road H7.

*French Reinforcements on 18 October*

Sebastiani's II Cavalry Corps is assumed, for the purposes of this standalone scenario, to have been allocated to the southern sector on 16 October, but is available to the northern sector on 18 October. It can start the 18th anywhere south of the Parthe still in French hands.

All of the Leipzig garrison is available to be deployed at the start of the 18th.

Oudinot's Young Guard Corps starts in Leipzig at the beginning of the 18th, as a reserve for the northern sector.

*Victory Conditions*

By the end of the 18th, the Allies must take Mockern, Eutritzsch and Mochau and gain some lodgement over the Parthe to equal what they achieved historically and hence draw. Success or failure is measured against this benchmark.

Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard. (Chris Robinson)

## Scenario D

## Wachau (southern sector) 16 to 18 October

You can play just the action of 16 October or continue to the action of 18 October as a second session. See scenario B for the allowable reorganisation during the lull of 17 October and possible defections.

Use columns C to J of the game map, adding K if you have space, rows one to three.

*Allied Briefing*

*Leaders: Schwarzenberg and Bennigsen are Commanders in Chief for their respective armies. Some of the larger corps have named divisional commanders as well as corps commanders, so it is possible to have three commanders affecting morale. All commanders have an influence of +1 with a 12-inch range. The monarchs and intermediate generals such as Wittgenstein and Constantine have no effect on morale and are not included in the order of battle, but players may wish to assume the persona of these characters.*

*Order of Battle*

The Army of Bohemia, excluding Gyulai's corps (which was in the Lindenau sector) and the Army of Poland.

French versus Austrians. (Mark Freeth, Wargames Holiday Centre)

*Deployment*

The Army of Bohemia (apart from reinforcements and Gyulai's corps) can be deployed halfway across boards C1 and D1 from the south, between the two rivers and eight inches from the southern table edge from the River Pleisse to Gross Posna, then diagonally as far as Fuchshain (the isolated building in J2).

The Russo-Prussian Guard cannot be committed without the permission of the Czar.

**Allied Reinforcements**

| | Day | Entrance Road | Score required |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Army of Bohemia** | | | |
| - Hessen-Homburg | 16th | Either E1 or board D1 | 10 |
| - Yermalov | 16th | E1 | 14 |
| - Colleredo | 16th | H2 | At end of day |
| **Army of the Poland** | 18th | K4 and K5 | 10 |

To calculate the score, throw three average dice and add the current game turn. All reinforcements enter either in column of route on the road or deployed eight inches either side of the road. Where there is a choice of road, players must make that choice before play commences.

Russian columns advance. (Mark Freeth, Wargames Holiday Centre)

*French Briefing*

Leaders: Maréchal Murat is Commander in Chief for the southern wing and is not a cavalry commander in this scenario. Some of the larger corps have named divisional commanders as well as corps commanders, so it is possible to have three commanders affecting morale. All commanders have an influence of +1 with a 12-inch range. Napoleon has no effect on combat morale but should be

played by a player to take strategic decisions. He can, however, influence the rallying of retreating and routing troops in the rear.

*French Order of Battle for 16 October*

All of the Imperial Guard (Old and Young Guard Corps, Guard Cavalry and Artillery)

II Corps – Victor

V Corps – Lauriston

VIII Corps – Poniatowski

IX Corps – Augereau

XI Corps – MacDonald

I, II, IV and V Cavalry Corps

*Deployment*

Sebastiani's II Cavalry Corps and MacDonald's XI Corps, having arrived the previous day, start in and around Taucha (I5). They therefore march onto the table (from the north side of boards I3 and J3 on turn 3 of 16 October.

The other formations can be deployed as the Emperor wishes within the following deployment area: from Leipzig, south along the east bank of the River Pleisse as far Mark-Kleeberg, then east through

Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz, then northeast as far as the Kolmberg heights.

*Change of Order of Battle for 18 October*

Murat loses Oudinot's First Young Guard Corps and Sebastiani's II Cavalry Corps because they are deemed to be reassigned to the northern sector.

*Victory Conditions*

If either side performs better than they did historically, this is considered a game victory. It is best to leave this to judgement, but as a guide, the French were still holding the line from Connewitz to Probstheida.

## Scenario E

## Lindenau (Western Sector)

Use columns A to D of the game map and rows two to four. The northern edge of the table will thus represent the river. As a small battle, it can be played in one session rather than having an overnight phase.

Prussian dragoons move up in support of the grenadiers. (Chris Robinson)

*French Briefing*

The objectives for the French are to hold the Lindenau side of the causeway and to push the Austrians out of the way in order to keep open a line of communications and possible retreat. Historically, this was achieved by Bertrand's corps. Although Napoleon reinforced Lindenau with two divisions of the Young Guard on 17 October, they were there as a contingency against the possibility of the Allies making a substantial reinforcement to this sector, which in practice they did not. The scenario therefore ignores the Young Guard.

The forces available consist of Bertrand's IV Corps plus the Leipzig Garrison. You may place in your deployment area, one fleche (mini redoubt) capable of holding one battery. This can be placed as a piece of card, to be revealed to the opponents once the battle starts and if in visibility range.

The French may start no further west than Lindenau village, except that they may place a skirmish outpost in Klein Zschocher (the isolated building in C3).

*Allied Briefing*

The Allied objectives are to take Lindenau and to deny the French any westward line of retreat. Only Gyulai's force is available. There are no reinforcements.

You may deploy within 12 inches of Markranstadt (B2).

*Victory Conditions*

If the Austrians succeed in blocking the two roads, they achieve a victory. If they manage to take Lindenau, they win a decisive victory. If the French open up one road they achieve a victory. If they open up both roads, they achieve a decisive victory.

## Scenario F

## Leipzig 19 October

Napoleon had lost the main battle by this time, but you can refight an interesting rearguard action in the following way. See Appendix I for special rules on breaking through gates and street fighting.

*French Briefing*

The objective for the French is to hold the city long enough to allow the evacuation of the maximum number of troops.

The game commences at 6:00 a.m. by which time most of the French baggage, cavalry and Guard have already crossed the causeway. Still lined up to retreat are:

IX Corps – Augereau

II Corps – Victor

II Cavalry Corps – Sebastiani

The above corps are represented in an abstract fashion and each are deemed to take two turns to cross. Once they have left, the rearguard can start to evacuate and this is done with figures on the table. The rearguard formations exclude those units that had defected by this time and are assumed to be about half their original strength of 16 October.

**French Rearguard Order of Battle for The Battle of Leipzig 19 October**

| | | | | Infantry Btns. | Cavalry Squadrons | Batteries | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C-in-C: Maréchal MacDonald** | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **III Corps - Souham (including remnants of Reynier's corps)** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 8-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | 2 | x 6 Light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **V Corps - Lauriston** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 2nd class | | | | | |
| | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | 12-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **VI Corps - Marshall Marmont** | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 36 1st class | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 6 French light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **VIII Corps - Prince Poniatowski (incorporating Rothenbourg's brigade)** | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 Veterans (Polish) | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Westphalian Guard (Elite) | | | | | |
| | 3 | | 1 x 6 skirmishers | 3 | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 6 Polish line lancers | | | 1 | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **XI Corps - Macdonald** | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 Veterans | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 1st class French | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 2nd class Westphalians | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 36 2nd class Italians | | | | | |
| | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Leipzig Garrison** - no general but can be put under command of a Corps commander | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 36 2nd class | 1 x 6 skirmishers | 2 | | | |
| | | 9-pdr foot battery (3 guns only) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 27 | 5 | 4 | 15 |

*Deployment*

The French hold the east bank of the Pleisse from Connewitz to Dolitz and then a line from Dolitz to Probstheida, then from Probstheida northwest to Rueudnitz, then north to the Parthe. They hold the south bank of the Parthe to the north of Leipzig and can have an outpost in Paffendorf.

*Blowing up the Bridge*

The youngest French player should be designated as Corporal Lafontaine and represented by an artillery figure next to the bridge over the Elster. Each turn that the bridge comes under musket fire, he must throw 1D6. A throw of one or two panics him and he detonates the mine.

West side of city. (Author's collection)

*Allied Briefing*

*Deployment: The Allies occupy a line through Mark-Kleeberg, Wachau and Liebetwolkwitz, then due north as far as the road in H4, then northwest to Schonefeld (isolated building in F5). Blucher's force is north of the Parthe, holding Eutritszsch to Mochau.*

*Order of Battle*

The Allies have sent the following forces in pursuit of the French towards the River Salle: all of the Austrian cavalry, the corps of Gyulai, Meerveldt and Yorck. All of the rest of the Allied forces are available but the starting order of battle is based on the formations that were used in the historical assault, considering losses suffered earlier. There is more cavalry present than you will need, so you can choose what you field. If need be, you can call up further forces from the reserves.

East side of city. (Author's collection; city wall from Magister Militum)

**Allied Order of Battle for The Battle of Leipzig 19 October**

| | | | | | Infantry Btns | Cavalry Sqdns | Btty | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Army of the Bohemia - Schwarzenberg** | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Austrian Corps - Colloredo** | | | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 48 Grenz | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 1st Class Jaegers | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 9 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 9 | | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (2 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **4th Austrian Corps - Klenau** | | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 48 Grenz | | | | | |
| | | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **2nd Prussian Corps - Kleist** | | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | |
| | | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Prussian Uhlans | | | 4 | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Army of Silesia - Blucher** | | | | | | | | |
| | **VIII Russian Corps/Advance Guard - St.Priest** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 6 | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **IX/X Russian Corps - Kapsevich** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 4 | btns | 1 x 6 Skirmishers | 4 | | | |
| | | 2 | x 8 Light cavalry | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | Infantry Btns | Cavalry Sqdns | Btty | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sacken's Russian Corps** | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | | |
| | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | | 5 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | | 1 | 6 |
| | 2 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Army of the North - Bernadotte** | | | | | | | | |
| **Wintzingerode's Russian Corps** | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | | 6 | | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | | 4 | | |
| | | Russian Horse battery (4 guns) | | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **3rd Prussian Corps - Bulow** | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 2nd Class | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 Landwehr | | | | | | |
| | 6 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | | 6 | | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Dragoons | | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Swedish Corps - Stedingk** | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Lifeguard (Elite) | | | | | | |
| | 1 | x 32 Vereran Grenadiers | | | | | | |
| | 2 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | | |
| | 3 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | | |
| | 7 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | | 7 | | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Militia Heavy Cavalry | | | | 4 | | |
| | 4 | x 6 Light Cavaly | | | | 4 | | |
| | | 6-pdr militia foot battery (3 guns + howitzer) | | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | British Rocket troop | | | | | 0.2 | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Russian Army of Poland - Bennigsen** | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 32 1st Clss | | | | | | |
| | 4 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | | |
| | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | | 8 | | | |
| | | 6-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | | 1 | 6 |

| | | | | | Infantry Btns | Cavalry Sqdns | Btty | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 4 | x 8 Light Cavalry | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Dragoons | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 61 | 40 | 6.2 | 27 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **In Reserve** | | | | | | | | |
| | **Russo-Prussian Guard Corps - Yermalov** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 Russian Guard | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Russian Pavlov Grenadiers (Elite) | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 Prussian Foot Gards (Elite) | | | | | |
| | | 8 | btns | 3 x 6 Skirmishers | 8 | | | |
| | | | Half Russian Guard 12-pdr battery (2 guns + 1 licorne) | | | | 0.5 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st/2nd Russian Cavaly Divisions - Rosen (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Guard Cuirassiers | | | 4 | | |
| | | | Russian line horse battery (4 guns) | | | | 1 | 4 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **3rd/4th Russian & Prussian Cavaly Divisions - Duka (cavalry sub-general)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 8 Russian Guard Hussars | | | 4 | | |
| | | 4 | x 6 Prussian Guard du Corp (Elite Heavies) | | | 4 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Don Cossacks - Ataman Platov (Cavalry Commander for these regts only)** | | | | | | | |
| | | 3 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 3 | | |
| | | 2 | x 5 Cossacks | | | 2 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Austrian Reserve Corps - Hessen-Homberg** | | | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 48 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 48 2nd Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 36 Elite Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 36 Veteran Grenadiers | | | | | |
| | | 5 | btns | 2 x 6 Skirmishers | 5 | | | |
| | | | 6-pdr Foot Battery (2 guns + howitzer) | | | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **1st Russian Corps - Gorchakov** | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 Veterans | | | | | |
| | | 2 | x 32 1st Class | | | | | |
| | | 1 | x 32 2nd class | | | | | |
| | | 4 | btns | 1 x 6 Skirmishers | 4 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **Russian Grenadier Corps - Rajevsky** | | | | | | | |
| | | 4 | x 32 Veterans | 1 x 6 Skirmishers | 4 | | | |
| | | | 12-pdr foot battery (4 guns + 2 licornes) | | | | 1 | 6 |

*Victory Conditions*

The game ends when the western escape route is closed, either by the mine being detonated or by the Allies blocking the escape route to the causeway. If the French have more than eight battalions trapped in the city at this point, they have lost the game. If they have less than eight, the Allies have lost.

## Scenario G

## The ‘What If’ Variant

This scenario assumes that St. Cyr evacuated Dresden on 8 October and stopped at the River Mulde to block Bennigsen’s Army of Poland, thus the latter is deleted from the order of battle. The chances of Saxon troops defecting increases from one in six to one in three, because of the abandonment of their capital.

The evacuation begins. (Author’s collection)

# 9

# Design Notes

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## The Game Map

The game map simplifies the historical, geographic map in several respects, for reasons of practicality. Not every village is represented on the game map and some that are represented, are treated as isolated buildings. This is because villages on a wargames table tend to take up more space than they would do if shown to scale and they tend to be very strong points. For example, the village of Plagwitz is not shown because it is close enough to Lindenau to be treated as one village.

The rivers Elster and Parthe, in the northern sector, form a V shape with Leipzig as the apex. The game map has flattened the shape somewhat, so that the terrain fits a rectangular table better.

The outer suburbs of Leipzig have been truncated for reasons of scale, but the key feature of the outer wall is represented.

No field works are shown on the game map. The ones around Lindenau were built on 15 October (during the battle), so it is reasonable and more challenging to give the players the decision on where to place the fleche. There were some defences built in Poniatowski's sector, but the French have plenty of villages and isolated buildings on the game map here.

## Pontoon Bridge

The sources used do not mention the Allies using pontoon bridges but the historical order of battles list two companies of pontoniers and a naval equipage company in Kapsevich's Russian corps and Blucher certainly used his Russian pontoons to cross the Elbe earlier in the month.[76] There are also accounts of the Prussian and Austrian engineers improvising makeshift bridges, therefore the game gives the Allies some bridge building capacity in the form of a pontoon bridging train in Kapsevich's corps, although the optional rules in Appendix I make it a risky business under fire.

## Order of Battle

Poniatowski is given a +2 effect on his troops' morale, not to make him a superhuman general, but as a mechanism to make the Poles more resilient to losses without making them expert fighters, as would be the case if one classed them as Elite.

The number of units has been substantially scaled down to make the game playable. If you wish to scale back up, for example for the smaller scenarios, you can add units back from the historical order of battle. Scaling down results in some formations being too small to field, consequently Lefol's and Dombrowski's independent brigades are not represented in the game.

Wargame rules work on standard sizes of battalions which don't necessarily conform to the actual sizes at a particular battle. For game purposes one has to take the historical headcount and divide by the standard size to get the number of wargame battalions. For example, the actual number of French infantry was about 148,500 arranged in 351 battalions, giving an average size of 423 men per battalion. ITGM rules assume a standard size of 720 men (represented by 36 figures), thus the actual full headcount would be represented by 202 game battalions. The actual Austrian battalions were closer to their standard ITGM size (represented by 48 figures): 112 actual battalions are equivalent to 97 ITGM battalions.

That many French battalions are too numerous to field on a tabletop, so the game order of battle scales the number of battalions down by a little over half for each side. A similar methodology has been used for the cavalry except that the number of squadrons has been scaled down by about two thirds for playability and the Cossacks have been halved again because many of them would have been out scouting and raiding. The number of artillery batteries has been scaled down much more because ITGM batteries are large and powerful (typically four-gun models for a foot battery). The game order of battle represents about one eighth of the historical number of batteries.

Ascertaining the number of infantry present is not straightforward because the sources do not always separate the numbers between infantrymen and artillerymen. Assumptions have been made using comparative data: Napoleon had 587 guns at Borodino with about 15,500 artillerymen and engineers,[77] therefore his 775 guns at Leipzig would account for about 20,500 men.

## Adapting the Order of battle for Other Rules

Unit sizes in the game order of battle are based on ITGM rules where a figure represents 20 men. The following are guidelines for conversion to other rule sets.

'Black Powder' classifies units as standard, large, small or tiny. Forty and 48-figure battalions in the game order of battle should be treated as large. Other battalions should be treated as standard, but the number of Russian and Prussian battalions should be decreased by 10 percent for their 32 man ITGM units to be equivalent to Black Powder units. Companies of skirmishers of six figures should be treated as tiny. For cavalry one could either treat each squadron as a small or tiny unit, or classify the regiments as being standard (24 figures) or large (32–36 figures). For artillery, if one treats a four model ITGM battery as being equivalent to a standard Black Powder battery, the Russians should have the number of their batteries increased by 50 percent.

'General de Brigade' rules have the same unit sizes as ITGM and therefore no adjustment is required.

## Average Dice

Average dice are six sided with sides marked 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5. Their use in the scenarios to roll for reinforcements eliminates extreme results, giving a greater chance of an average result. If you do not have average dice, use a d6 and treat a one as a three and a six as a four.

## Appendix I

# Optional Rules

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A few of these rules are specific to ITGM rules but the spirit of them can be adopted for other rule sets.

**Pontoon trains move at the same speed as foot artillery. It takes a full three moves to lay a bridge after arriving at a river. If firing at it, treat it the same as an artillery target (small, C class) and equivalent to unlimbered artillery while laying a bridge. For every three casualties it suffers, it takes an extra turn to lay a bridge. Once it suffers seven casualties, it will disperse. Casualties can be recorded on a roster sheet.**

**Horse batteries fire only once per turn with no penalty for movement.**

**Austrian 48 figure battalions take a full move to change formation regardless of class.**

**Landwehr cavalry counts as militia light cavalry.**

**Prussian landwehr infantry have a basic morale of first-class line (+3) but fire and mêlée at three quarters effect. They move as militia and cannot form line.**

**Russian infantry which loses a melee receive a +3-morale modifier. They fire two classes lower than their actual class but cannot fire lower than militia. Thus first class and second-class line fire as militia and veterans fire as second class. Use their actual class when testing the range of fire when being charged.**

The British rocket troop fires as a single howitzer with the range of a 12-pounder cannon. Under the ITGM rule:

If a hit is achieved, role 1 d10 [10 sided dice]. If a 9 or 10 is rolled, the rocket hits the target. If a 1 to 8 is rolled, this represents the eight points of the compass from the centre of the original target. Roll a further 1d10 and this is the number of inches along the compass line of the previous d10 toll from which the rocket deviates. If the rocket hits a target, it counts 8 Artillery Points [equivalent to 2 rounds of ball] and does not count all guns hitting. Any cavalry within 6'' of the point of impact becomes unformed. If any cavalry become unformed, they regain order after the morale phase of the same turn.[78]

The French may join two batteries of the same corps into a grand battery. For this purpose, regard the Guard as one formation. A general from the formation, or higher, must remain with the grand

battery. Batteries in a grand battery fire separately but may concentrate fire and both may fire if one is charged.

**Breaking through a city gate requires a battalion to contact it and then throw a six with one d6. If they have previously weakened the gate with four artillery hits (of ball not cannister), they need a five or six. Once they have broken through the gate, they fight a melee with the garrison. For a large gate, up to 18 men can fight using normal melee rules, with no advantage to either side. While they are trying to break through the gate, the defenders can fire with up to 18 men from the gatehouse/neighbouring houses. For a small, postern gate, use the rules for attacking an isolated building: up to six men can fight (throwing one d6 each), with the attacker needing a six to kill and the defenders a five or six.**

**Street Fighting within the inner walls of Leipzig can be simulated simply by quartering off the city into a number of villages and using standard rules for fighting except allowing reinforcement adjoining villages.**

2022

# Appendix II

# Historical Orders of Battle

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## French Historical Order of Battle

## Commander in Chief: The Emperor Napoleon

**Imperial Guard**

| | | Old Guard | | Guard Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1st Div. Friant | 2nd Div. Curial | |
| Old Guard | Btns | 8 | 4 | |
| Saxon Guard | Btns | | 1 | |
| Polish Guard | Btns | | 1 | |
| Westphalian Guard | Btns | | 1 | |
| Italian Velites | Btns | | 2 | |
| Guard 12pdr | Btty | 1 | | 4 |
| Guard 6pdr | Btty | 1 | 2 | |
| Guard Horse Artillery | Btty | | | 2 |
| Berg Horse Artillery | Btty | | | 1 |

| | | 1st Yg Gd Corps Oudinot | | 2nd Yg Gd Corps Mortier | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1st Div. Pacthod | 3rd Div. Decouz | 2nd Div. Barrois | 4th Div. Roguet |
| Young Guard | Btns | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Guard 6pdr | Btty | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

| | | Guard Cavalry Corps: Nansouty | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1st Div. Ornano | 2nd Div. Lefebvre-Desnouéttes | 3rd Div. Walther | |
| Duchy of Berg LC | Sqns | 5 | | | |
| Dutch Lancers | Sqns | 10 | | | |
| 'YG' Dragoons | Sqns | 2 | | | |
| Polish Lancers | Sqns | | 4 | 3 | |
| Grenadiers a Cheval | Sqns | | 2 | 4 | |
| Chasseurs a Cheval | Sqns | | 4 | 6 | Inc.Mamelukes |
| Guard d'Honeur | Sqns | | | 6 | |
| Empress Dragoons | Sqns | | | 4 | |
| Guard Horse Battery | Sqns | 1 | 1 | 2 | |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Imperial Guard** | 65 | 50 | 27 |

**II Corps: Victor**

| | | 4th Div. Dubreton | 5th Div. Dufour | 6th Div. Vial | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French line infantry | Btns | 12 | 8 | 12 | 32 |
| 6lb foot | Btty | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |

**III Corps: Souham**

| **8th Division: Brayer** | | 8th Div. Brayer | 9th Div. Delmas | 11th Div. Ricard | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French line | Btns | 15 | 9 | 14 | |
| French provisional | Btns | | 2 | | |
| 6lb batteries | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| 8lb batteries | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| 12 lb batteries | Btty | | | | 2 |
| Horse battery | Btty | 0.5 | | | 1 |
| French Light cavalry | Sqns | 6 | | | |
| Baden Light Cavalry | Sqns | | 5 | | |

| | | Detached from IV Cavalry Corps | 6th Light Cav. Div: Fournier (detched from III Cav. Corps) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dragoons | Sqns | 5 | |
| French Light cavalry | Sqns | | 16 |
| Horse battery | Btty | | 0.5 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total III Corps** | 40 | 32 | 10 |

**IV Corps Bertrand**

| | | 12th Div. Morand | 15th Ital Div Fontanelli | 38th Div Franquemont | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 14 | | | |
| Italian | Btns | | 5 | | |
| Milan Guard | Btns | | 2 | | |
| Wurttemberg | Btns | | | 4 | |
| Foot batteries | Btty | 2 | 1 | | |
| 12 lb battery | | | | | 1 |

| | | 24th Light Cav Bgde | 29th Light Cav Bgde |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wurttemberg LC | Sqns | 1 | |
| Wurttemberg Horse | Btty | 1 | |
| Westphalian LC | Sqns | | 1 |
| Hessen-Darmstadt LC | Sqns | | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total IV Corps** | 25 | 3 | 5 |

**V Corps: Lauriston**

| 10th Division: Albert | | 10th Div Albert | 16th Div Maison | 19th Div Rochambeau | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 9 | 12 | 12 | |
| French provisional | Btns | 2 | | | |
| 6lb foot | Btty | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | |
| 12 lb batteries | Btty | | | | 2 |
| Horse battery | Btty | | | | 1 |

| | | 6th Light Cavalry Bgd |
|---|---|---|
| French light cavalry | Sqns | 8 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total V Corps** | 35 | 8 | 6.5 |

**VI Corps: Marmont**

| | | 20th Div Compans | 21st Div Lagrange | 22nd Div Freidrichs | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 2 | 5 | 8 | |
| French provisional | Btns | 4 | | 6 | |
| French naval | Btns | 8 | 9 | | |
| 6lb foot | Btty | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| 12 lb batteries | Btty | | | | 3 |
| Horse batteries | Btty | | | | 1 |

| | | 25th (Wurttemberg) LC Bgd: Normann | 5th Light Cav Div Lorge |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (part of III Cav Corps) |
| Wurtemberg Light Cav | Sqns | 8 | |
| French light cavalry | Sqns | | 17 |
| Wurttemberg Horse | Btty | 1 | |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total VI Corps** | 42 | 25 | 11 |

**VII Corps: Reynier**

| | | 13th Div Guillemont | 32nd Div Durette | 24th Div Zeschau | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 10 | 5 | | |
| Wurzburg | Btns | | 1 | | |
| Saxon | Btns | | | 8 | |
| 6lb foot | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| 12 lb batteries | Btty | | | | 1 |
| Saxon 12 lb | Btty | | | 1 | 1 |
| Saxon Horse | Btty | | | | 1 |

| | | 24th (Saxon) Light Cavalry Bgd |
|---|---|---|
| Saxon uhlans | Sqns | 5 |
| Saxon hussars | Sqns | 5 |
| Saxon Horse | Btty | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total VII Corps** | 24 | 10 | 8 |

| **VIII Corps: Poniatowski** | | 26th Div Kamieniecki | 27th Div Krasinski | Reserve Artillery | 27th LC Bgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polish | Btns | 10 | 4 | | |
| Polish 6 lb | Btts | 2 | 1 | | |
| Polish 12 lb | Btts | | | 2 | |
| Polish light cavalry | Sqns | | | | 4 |
| Polish Cuirassiers | Sqns | | | | 2 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total VIII Corps** | 14 | 6 | 5 |

| **IX Corps: Augerau** | | 51st Div ? | 52nd Div Semelle | Reserve Artillery | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 1 | 4 | | 5 |
| French provisional | Btns | 6 | 2 | | 8 |
| 6lb foot | Btty | 2 | 0 | | 2 |
| 12 lb batteries | Btty | | | 2 | 2 |

| **XI Corps: MacDonald** | | 31st Div Ledru | 35th Div Gerard | 36th Div Charpentier | 39th Div Marchand | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | | 7 | 11 | | |
| French provisional | Btns | 6 | | | | |
| Westphalian | Btns | 3 | | | | |
| Neapolitan | Btns | 3 | | | | |
| Italian | Btns | | 6 | | | |
| Baden | Btns | | | | 4 | |
| Hesse-Darmstadt | Btns | | | | 5 | |
| French foot 6lb | Btty | 1 | 1 | 2 | | |
| French horse | Btty | | | | | 1 |
| Westphalian foot | Btty | 2 | | | | |
| Italian horse | Btty | | 1 | | | |
| Baden foot | Btty | | | | 0.5 | |
| Hessian foot | Btty | | | | 0.5 | |
| French 12lb | Btty | | | | | 2 |

| | | 28th Light Cavalry Bgd |
|---|---|---|
| Wurzberg light cav | Sqns | 1 |
| Italian/Neapolitan Light | Sqns | 6 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total XI Corps** | 45 | 7 | 11 |

| **Independent 'Divisions'** | | Lefol | 27th Div Dombrowski | L.Garrison Margaron |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| French | Btns | 3 | | 4 |
| French provisional | Btns | | | 4 |
| Baden | Btns | | | 1 |
| Polish | Btns | | 4 | |
| Polish light cavalry | Sqns | | 4 | |
| Polish lancers | Sqns | | 4 | |
| Polish foot | Btty | | 0.5 | |
| Polish horse | Btty | | 0.5 | |
| French horse | Btty | | | 1 |
| Baden foot | Btty | | | 0.5 |
| Fr.provisional dragoons | Sqns | | | 6 |
| French dragoons | Sqns | (detached from III Cav) | | 5 |
| French cuirassiers | Sqns | (detached from III Cav) | | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Independent 'Divisions'** | 16 | 20 | 2.5 |

| **I Cavalry Corps:** **Latour-Maubourg** | | 1st LC Div Berckheim | 2nd LC Div Corbineau | 3rd LC Div Chastel | 1st HC Div Bourdesoulle | 3rd HC Div Doumerc |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French light | Sqns | 10 | 8 | 13 | | |
| Italian/Neapolitan Light | Sqns | 4 | | | | |
| Fr cuirassier/carabiniers | Sqns | | | | 16 | 8 |
| Saxon kurassiers | Sqns | (Zastro Regt) | | | 4 | |
| Saxon Leib Kurass.Gde. | Sqns | | | | 4 | |
| Italian dragoons | Sqns | | | | | 4 |
| French dragoons | Sqns | | | | | 9 |
| Horse battery | Btty | | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Saxon horse battery | Btty | | | | 1 | |

| | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|
| **Total I Cavalry Corps** | 80 | 4 |

| II Cavalry Corps: Sebastiani | | 2nd LC Div d'Hurbal | 4th LC Div Exelmans | 2nd HC Div St.Germain | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French light | Sqns | 18 | 24 | | 42 |
| Fr cuirassiers | Sqns | | | 16 | 16 |
| Horse battery | Sqns | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 2 |

| IV Cavalry Corps: Sokolnicki | | 7th LC Div Tolinski | 8th LC Div Sulkowski | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polish light | Sqns | 4 | | 4 |
| Polish lancers | Sqns | 4 | 8 | 12 |
| Polish horse batteries | Btts | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 |
| French horse batteries | Btts | 1 | 1 | 2 |

| V Cavalry Corps: Pajol | | 9th LC Div Piré | 5th HC L'Heretier | 6th HC Milhaud | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| French light | Sqns | 13 | | | 13 |
| French dragoons | Sqns | | 15 | 12 | 27 |
| French horse batteries | Btts | | | 1 | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL ARMY** | **351** | **355** | **105** |

## Summary of Historical French Army

| | Men incl art. | Btns | Sqns | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Old Gd Div | 6,255 | 8 | | 16 |
| 2nd Old Gd Div | 4,664 | 9 | | 16 |
| 1st Yg Gd div | 6,044 | 12 | | 24 |
| 3rd Yg Gd div | 4,731 | 12 | | 24 |
| 2nd Yg Gd div | 5,470 | 12 | | 24 |
| 4th Yg Gd div | 5,221 | 12 | | 24 |
| Gd Reserve Art | 3,911 | | | 54 |
| Guard Cavalry | 8,043 | | 50 | 24 |
| | 44,339 | 65 | 50 | 206 |
| II Corps | 16,178 | 32 | 0 | 40 |
| III Corps | 20,783 | 40 | 11 | 73 |
| IV Corps | 10,444 | 25 | 3 | 34 |
| V Corps | 13,039 | 41 | 8 | 53 |
| VI Corps | 18,858 | 42 | 8 | 84 |
| VII | 12,637 | 24 | 10 | 48 |
| VIII | 5,000 | 14 | 6 | 40 |
| IX | 9,186 | 13 | 0 | 32 |
| XI | 20,553 | 40 | 7 | 79 |
| Lefol | 2,229 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Dombrowski | 2,850 | 4 | 8 | 8 |
| Leipzig Garrison | 4,820 | 9 | 6 | 10 |
| 1st Cav corps | 6,480 | | 80 | 24 |
| 2nd Cav Corps | 5,679 | | 58 | 12 |
| 3rd Cav Corps | 4,000 | | 44 | 6 |
| 4th Cav Corps | 3,000 | | 16 | 20 |
| 5th Cav Corps | 5,000 | | 40 | 6 |
| **Total** | **205,075** | **351** | **355** | **775** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Cavalry | 39,000 | Estimate |
| Infantry | 145,000 | Balancing figure |
| Artillery | 21,000 | Estimate |
| | **205,000** | |

**Allied Historical Order of Battle**

ARMY OF BOHEMIA

**Commander in Chief: Prince Schwarzenberg**

**I Austrian Corps: Colleredo**

| | | 1st Lt Div M.du Lichenstein | Div Hardegg | Div Wimgffen | Div Greth | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian Line | Btns | | 2 | 10 | 10 | |
| Austrian Jaegers | Btns | 3 | 1 | | | |
| Austrian Landwehr | Btns | | | 1 | | |
| Grenz | Btns | 1 | | | | |
| Austrian Dragoons | Sqns | 4 | 5 | | | |
| Austrian Light cav | Sqns | 12 | 11 | | | |
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Austrian Horse btty | Btty | 2 | | | | |
| Austrian 12pdr | Btty | | | | | 2 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total I Austrian Corps** | 28 | 32 | 10 |

**II Austrian Corps: Meerveldt**

| | | Div Lederer | Div A. du Lichenst. | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian Line | Btns | 4 | 10 | |
| Austrian Landwehr | Btns | | 2 | |
| Grenz | Btns | 1 | | |
| Austrian Dragoons | Sqns | 4 | | |
| Austrian Light cav | Sqns | 5 | | |
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Austrain 12pdr | Btty | | | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total II Austrian Corps** | 17 | 9 | 7 |

**III Austrian Corps: Gyulai**

| | | Div Crenneville | Div Murray | Div P.Hessen-Homberg | Reserve Art | Streifkorps Thielmann/ Mensdorf |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian Line | Btns | | 6 | 10 | | |
| Grenz | Btns | 2 | | | | |
| Austrian Light cav | Sqns | | | | | 9 |
| Austrian Uhlans | Sqns | 11 | | | | |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | | | | 10 |
| Prussian Landw cav. | Sqns | | | | | 2 |
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| Austrian 3 pdr | Btty | 1 | | | | |
| Austrian Horse btty | Btty | | | | | 0.5 |
| Austrian 12pdr | Btty | | | | 2 | |

| | Btns | Sqns | Cossacks | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total III Austrian Corps** | 18 | 22 | 10 | 7.5 |

| **IV Austrian Corps: Klenau** | | **Mohr** | **Hohenloe** | **Heldens-feld** | **Cav. Bgd Desfours** | **Reserve Art** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian Line | Btns | | 11 | 10 | | |
| Grenz | Btns | 3 | | | | |
| Austrian Light cav | Sqns | 12 | | | 6 | |
| Austrian Cuirassiers | Sqns | | | | 6 | |
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | | 2 | 2 | | |
| Austrin 3 pdr | Btty | | | | | 0.5 |
| Austrian Horse btty | Btty | 1.5 | | | | |
| Austrian 12pdr | Btty | | | | | 1 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total IV Austrian Corps** | 24 | 24 | 7 |

| **Austrian Reserve:** | | **Weissen-wolf** | **R.Bianchi** | **Cav Div Nostitz** | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Hessen-Homburg** | | | | | |
| Austrian Line | Btns | | 12 | | 12 |
| Austrian Grenadiers | Btns | 8 | | | 8 |
| Austrian Cuirassiers | Sqns | | | 28 | 28 |
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | 2 | 3 | | 5 |

| **Army Reserve Artillery** | | |
|---|---|---|
| Austrian 6pdr foot | Btty | 6 |
| Austrin 3 pdr | Btty | 2 |
| Austrian 12pdr | Btty | 6 |
| Austiran 16 pdr | Btty | 2 |
| | | 16 |

| **Mobile Column** | | |
|---|---|---|
| Austrian Landwehr | Btns | 1 |
| Prussian Landw cav. | Sqns | 2 |

| **Russian Cavalry Division: Pahlen** | |
|---|---|
| Russian Light Cav | 16 |
| Russian Uhlans | 8 |
| Cossacks | 12 |
| | 36 |

**I Russian Corps:Gorchakov**

| | | 5th Div Mesenzieff | 14th Div Helfriech | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Jaegers | Btns | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Russian line | Btns | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| Oldenburg Militia | Btns | 1 | | 1 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | 2 | 2 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | 1 | 1 |

**II Russian Corps: Prince Eugen of Wurttenberg**

| | | 3rd Div Schachafskoi | 4th Div Puesschnitzki | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Jaegers | Btns | 4 | 4 | 24 |
| Russian line | Btns | 8 | 8 | |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | 2 | 5 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | 1 | |
| Russian Horse btty | Btty | | 2 | |

**II Prussian Corps: Kleist**

| | | 9th Bgd Klux | 10th Bgd Pirch | 11th Bgd Zeithen | 12th bgd Prince August | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prussian line | Btns | 3.5 | 3 | 3.5 | 3 | |
| Prusian Reserve | Btns | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | |
| Prussian Landwehr | Btns | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Prussian 6pdr | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Prussian 12pdr | Btty | | | | | 2 |
| Prussian 7 pdr Hwt | Btty | | | | | 1 |
| Prussian Landw cav | Sqns | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Prussian Dragoons | Sqns | | | 6 | | |
| Prussian Uhlans | Sqns | | | | 4 | |
| Freiwillige-Jaeger | Sqns | | | | 0.5 | |

| | | Cav Bgd Roder | Cav Bgd Mytius |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prussian Cuirassiers | Sqns | 12 | |
| Freiwillige-Jaeger | Sqns | 1.5 | |
| Prussian Landw cav | Sqns | | 5 |
| Prussian horse btty | Btty | 2 | |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total II Prussian Corps** | 31 | 34 | 10 |

**Russo-Prussian Reserve: Grand Duke Constantine**

| **Grenadier Corps: Rajewski** | | **1st Gr. Div Pisareff** | **2nd Gr. Div Tchoglokoff** | **Reserve Artillery** | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Grenadiers | Btns | 12 | 10 | | 22 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | 1 | 1 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | | 2 | 2 |

| **Russo-Prussian Guard Corps: Yermaloff** | | **Div Rosen** | **Div Udom** | **Gd Bge Alvensleben** | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Guard | Btns | 10 | 8 | | 18 |
| Prussian Guard | Btns | | | 6.5 | 6.5 |
| Russian Gd 12 pdr | Btty | 1 | | | 1 |
| Russian Gd 6 pdr | Btty | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
| Prussian Gd 6 pdr | Btty | | | 1 | 1 |

| **Guard Cavalry: Prince Galltizin** | | **1st Cu Div Depreradovich** | **2nd Cu Div Kretov** | **3rd Cu Div Duka** | **Gd Cav Div Schevich** | **Prussian Gd Cav** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Gd Cu. | Sqns | 20 | | | | |
| Russian Gd Hussars | Sqns | | | | 6 | |
| Russian Gd Uhlans | Sqns | | | | 6 | |
| Russian Gd Dgns | Sqns | | | | 6 | |
| Russian Cuirassiers | Sqns | | 18 | 16 | | |
| Prussian Gd du Corp | Sqns | | | | | 6 |
| Prussian mixed Gd | Sqns | | | | | 5 |
| Russian Gd Horse | Btty | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Russian horse art. | Btty | | | 1 | | |
| Prussian horse art. | Btty | | | | | 1 |

| **Don Cossacks: Ataman Platov** | | |
|---|---|---|
| Cossacks | Sqns | 38 |

| **Reserve Artillery** | | |
|---|---|---|
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | 4 |
| Russian Horse btty | Btty | 2.5 |
| Russian Guard 12pdr | Btty | 1 |
| | | 7.5 |

| | **Btns** | **Cav Sqns** | **Cossack Sqn** | **Btty** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Russo-Prussian Reserve** | 46.5 | 83 | 38 | 18.5 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL ARMY OF BOHEMIA** | 234.5 | 258 | 60 | 89 |

## ARMY OF SILESIA

## Commander in Chief: General der Kavalrie von Blucher

**1st Prussian Corps: Yorck**

| | | 1st Bgd Steinmetz | 2nd Bgd Mecklenburg | 7th Bgd Horn | 8th Bgd Hunnerbein | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prussian Grenadiers | Btns | 4 | | | | 4 |
| Prussian Line | Btns | | 6 | 3.5 | 3 | 12.5 |
| Prusian Reserve | Btns | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Prussian Landwehr | Btns | 7 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 15 |
| Prussian 6pdr | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Prussian Hussars | Sqns | 4 | 4 | | | 8 |
| Brandenburg Hussars | Sqns | | | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Prussian Ldw cavalry | Sqns | | | 2 | 2 | 4 |

| | | Corps Cavalry Wahlen-Jurgass | | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prussian dragoons | Sqns | | 8.5 | |
| Prussian Ldw cavalry | Sqns | | 20 | |
| Prussian horse | Btty | | 2 | |
| Prussian 3 pdr | Btty | | | 1 |
| Prussian 6pdr | Btty | | | 2 |
| Prussian 12pdr | Btty | | | 2 |

| | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total 1st Prussian Corps** | 34.5 | 45.5 | 11 |

**Sacken's Russian Corps**

| | | 10th Div Lieven | 16th Div (part) Repninski | 27th Div Neverowski | Corps Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 4 | | 3 | |
| Russian line | Btns | 6 | 4 | 4 | |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | | | 2 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | | 1 |
| Russian horse btty | Btty | | | | 1 |

| | | 2nd Hu Div Lanskoi | 3rd Dgn Div Wasilltchikov | Coss. Div Karpoff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian hussars | Sqns | 21 | | |
| Russian dragoons | Sqns | | 7 | |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | | 24 |

| | Btns | Cav Sqns | Cossack Sqn | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Sacken's Rrussian Corps** | 21 | 28 | 24 | 4 |

**Langeron's Russian Corps Group**

| Avantegarde: Rudzewitch | | Cav Div Korf | 9th Div Udom II | Artillery | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | | 2 | | 8 |
| Russian line | Btns | | 6 | | |
| Russian light cav | Sqns | 4 | | | 14 |
| Russian dragoons | Sqns | 10 | | | |
| Cossacks | Sqns | 12 | | | 12 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | 1 | 2 |
| Russian horse btty | Btty | | | 1 | |

| VIII Corps Russian Corps: St.Priest | | 11th Div Gurjaloff | 17th Div Pillar | Cav Div Borosdin II | Corps Artillery | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 3 | 4 | | | 21 |
| Russian line | Btns | 6 | 8 | | | |
| Russian dragoons | Sqns | | | 12 | | 12 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | | 8 | | 8 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | | | 2 | 3 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | | 1 | |

| IX Russian Corps: Olsuvieff | | 15th Div Korniloff |
|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 3 |
| Russian line | Btns | 5 |

| X Russian Corps: Kapsevitch | | 8th Div Urusoff | 22nd Div Tourchaninov | Corps Artillery | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 3 | 4 | | 16 |
| Russian line | Btns | 5 | 4 | | |
| Russian light cav | Sqns | 6 | | | 6 |
| Pontoonier/naval equipage btn | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | | 3 | 8 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | 4 | |
| Cossack Horse btty | Btty | | | 1 | |

| | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL ARMY OF SILESIA** | 108.5 | 105.5 | 44 | 28 |

# ARMY OF THE NORTH: BERNADOTTE, CROWN PRINCE OF SWEDEN

**Russian Corps: Winzingerode**

| | | Avantegarde Woronzoff | 21st Div Lapteff | 24th Div Wuitsch | Temp Div Harpe | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 5 | 2 | 3 | | 10 |
| Russian line | Btns | | 4 | 7 | 4 | 15 |
| Russian grenadiers | Btns | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Russian light cav | Sqns | 6 | | | | 6 |
| Russian uhlans | Sqns | 3 | | | | 3 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | 25 | | | | 25 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | 1 | | 2 | 3 |
| Russian horse btty | Btty | 1 | | | | 1 |

| | | Cav Div Manteuffel | Cav Div M.Pahlen | Cav Bgd | Coss.Bge | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian light cav | Sqns | 6 | 4 | 2 | | 12 |
| Russian uhlans | Sqns | | | 6 | | 6 |
| Russian dragoons | Sqns | 4 | 5 | | | 9 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | 2 | | | 17 | 19 |
| Russian horse btty | Btty | 1 | 2 | | | 3 |

| | | | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqn | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Winzingerode** | | | 28 | 36 | 44 | 9 |

**III Prussian Corps: Bulow**

| | | 3rd Div L.H-Homburg | 5th Div Borstell | 6th Div Krafft | Reserve Artillery | Cav Div Oppen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prussian grenadiers | Btns | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Prussian line | Btns | 2 | 3 | 3 | | |
| Prusian reserve | Btns | 3 | 3 | 3 | | |
| Prussian landwehr | Btns | 4 | 4 | 3 | | |
| Prussian hussars | Sqns | 4 | 4 | | | |
| Prussian uhlans | Sqns | | 4 | | | |
| Pr. Ldw cavalry | Sqns | | | 3 | | 12 |
| Prussian dragoons | Sqns | | | | | 12 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | | | | 4 |
| Prussian 6 pdr foot | Btty | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | | | | 2 | |
| Prussian 12 pdr | Btty | | | | 2 | |
| Prussian horse | Btty | | | | 1 | 2 |

| | | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqn | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total III Prussian Corps** | | 30 | 39 | 4 | 11 |

| Swedish Corps: Stedingk | | 1st Div Posse | 2nd Div Sandels | Cav Div Skoldebrand | Reserve Artillery | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swedish Lifeguard | Btns | 3 | | | | 3 |
| Swedish Grenadiers | Btns | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Swedish Line | Btns | 5 | 13 | | | 18 |
| Swedish Gd Dragoons | Sqns | 5 | | | | 5 |
| Swedish Dragoons | Sqns | | | 6 | | 6 |
| Sweidsh Cuirassiers | Sqns | | | 4 | | 4 |
| Swedish Light | Sqns | 1 | | 11 | | 12 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | | 3 | | 3 |
| British Rocket Troop | Btty | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Swedish Horse Btty | Btty | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Swedish 12pdr | Btty | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Swedish 6pdr | Btty | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 5 |

| | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqn | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Swedish Corps** | 23 | 27 | 3 | 8 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL ARMY OF THE NORTH** | 81 | 102 | 51 | 28 |

**ARMY OF POLAND: GENERAL DER CAVALERIE BENNIGSEN**

| Russian Corp: Doctorov | | Avantegarde Stroganoff | Cav Div Tschaplitz |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | 4 | |
| Russian light cav | Sqns | 5 | 8 |
| Russian uhlans | Sqns | 5 | 16 |
| Russian dragoons | Sqns | 15 | 5 |
| Cossacks | Sqns | | 6 |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | 1 | |
| Russian horse btty | Btty | | 1 |

| | | 12th Div Chovansky | 26th Div Paskievich | 13th Div Linsdorf | Reserve Artillery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian jaegers | Btns | | 4 | | |
| Russian line | Btns | 8 | 8 | 10 | |
| Russian 6 pdr | Btty | 1 | 1 | | 3 |
| Russian 12 pdr | Btty | 1 | 1 | | 2 |

| | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqn | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Doctorov Corps** | 34 | 54 | 6 | 11 |

| Detached from I Austrian Corps | | 2nd Austrian Light Division Bubna |
|---|---|---|
| Austrian line | Btns | 1 |
| Austrian jaegers | Btns | 1 |
| Austrian landwehr | Btns | 1 |
| Grenz | Btns | 1 |
| Austrian light cav | Sqns | 10 |
| Austrin 3 pdr | Btty | 1 |
| Austrian horse | Btty | 2 |

| | Btns | Cav Sqns | Coss Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL ARMY OF POLAND** | 38 | 64 | 6 | 14 |
| **TOTAL OF ALL ALLIED ARMIES** | **462** | **529.5** | **161** | **159** |

## Summary of Historical Allied Armies

| Austrian | Total Headcount | Gunners (estimated) | Cavalry/ Cossacks | Infantry | Btns | Sqn | Guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colleredo (incl.Bubna) | 33,564 | | 6,000 | | 32 | 46 | 86 |
| Meerveldt | 14,129 | | 1,092 | | 17 | 9 | 42 |
| Gyulai | 20,526 | | 1,707 | | 22 | 13 | 42 |
| Streifkorps | 2,290 | | 2,190 | | - | 19 | 4 |
| Less detached from Gyulai | (3,800) | | (220) | | (4) | (2) | (6) |
| Klenau | 24,544 | | 3,285 | | 24 | 30 | 46 |
| Hessen-Homberg | 19,739 | | 3,390 | | 20 | 28 | 30 |
| Army Reserve Art | 5,500 | | - | | - | - | 112 |
| Mobile column' | 1,400 | | 200 | | 1 | 2 | - |
| | 117,892 | 9,400 | 17,644 | 90,848 | 112 | 145 | 356 |
| Russo-Prussian | | | | | | | |
| Pahlen | 2,600 | - | 2,600 | - | | 36 | - |
| Gortschakoff | 5,700 | 900 | - | 4,800 | 25 | - | 36 |
| Eugen | 5,200 | 1,500 | - | 3,700 | 24 | - | 60 |
| Rajewski | 9,100 | 900 | - | 8,200 | 22 | | 36 |
| Russian Gd Inf | 8,070 | 900 | - | 7,170 | 18 | | 36 |
| Russian Gd Cav | 7,200 | 900 | 6,300 | - | | 72 | 36 |
| Prussian Gd | 6,680 | 400 | 1,210 | 5,070 | 8 | 11 | 16 |
| Don Cossacks | 3,800 | - | 3,800 | - | | 38 | - |
| Art Reserve | 2,350 | 2,350 | - | - | | | 94 |
| Kleist | 24,251 | 2,000 | 5,182 | 17,069 | 31 | 32 | 80 |
| Army of Bohemia | 192,843 | 19,250 | 36,736 | 136,857 | 240 | 334 | 750 |
| Yorck | 21,149 | 2,600 | 5,005 | 13,544 | 34.5 | 45.5 | 104 |
| Sacken | 13,798 | 1,072 | 5,587 | 7,139 | 19 | 52 | 60 |
| Avante Garde | 6,960 | 444 | 3,322 | 3,194 | 8 | 26 | 24 |
| St.Priest | 10,393 | 601 | 2,118 | 7,674 | 21 | 20 | 36 |
| Olsuvieff | 2,892 | - | - | 2,892 | 8 | - | - |
| Kapsevitch | 8,686 | 2,319 | 600 | 5,767 | 16 | 6 | 86 |
| Army of Silesia | 63,878 | 7,036 | 16,632 | 40,210 | 106.5 | 149.5 | 310 |
| Bulow | 24,619 | 2,350 | 4,730 | 17,539 | 30 | 43 | 94 |
| Winzingerode | 24,739 | 2,400 | 6,270 | 16,069 | 28 | 57 | 96 |
| Swedish | 17,165 | 1,150 | 3,300 | 12,715 | 23 | 30 | 46 |
| Army of the North | 66,523 | 5,900 | 14,300 | 46,323 | 81 | 130 | 236 |
| Avante Garde | 8,257 | 350 | 2,750 | 5,157 | 4 | 25 | 14 |
| Doktorov | 25,618 | 3,000 | 3,850 | 18,768 | 30 | 35 | 120 |
| Army of Poland | 33,875 | 3,350 | 6,600 | 23,925 | 34 | 60 | 134 |
| **Total** | **357,119** | **35,536** | **74,268** | **247,315** | **462** | **674** | **1,430** |

**Notes:**

Sources: primarily Smith, 1813 Leipzig, pp.304–344 and Nafziger, Napoleon at Leipzig, pp.335–357.

Abbreviations: Btns = battalions; Btty = batteries; Cu = Cuirassier; Dgn = Dragoon; Ldw = Landwehr; Sqns = Squadrons;

Standard size of batteries:

French foot – six guns and two howitzers

French horse – six guns

Prussian foot and horse – six guns and two howitzers

Austrian 12-pdr foot – six guns

Austrian 6-pdr foot – six or eight guns

Austrian horse – six guns

Russian foot and horse – eight guns and four licornes (similar to howitzers)

Sources give Cossacks in pulks, which varied from three to five sotnias or squadrons. This order of battle assumes one Cossack squadron = 100 men.

French troops in training depots were formed into Provisional regiments for their march to the front and then distributed to regular units. If units are designated as Provisional in the order of battle, that implies that they were newly arrived and hence inexperienced.

# Appendix III

# Historical Losses

## Total Losses For Whole Battle

| | Chandler Note 1 | Petre Note 2 | Smith Note 3 | Nafziger Note 4 | Hofschroer Note 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **French** | | | | | |
| Killed & wounded | 38,000 | 38,000 | 50,000 | 22,000 | 22,000 |
| Captured on 19th | 30,000 | 15,000 | 14,000 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| Sick & wounded in hospitals | | 15,000 | 20,000 | 23,000 | 23,000 |
| German allies deserted | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,500 | | |
| Total French losses | 73,000 | 73,000 | 89,500 | 60,000 | 60,000 |
| | | | | | |
| Guns abandoned | 325 | 325 | | 300 | 300 |
| | | | | | |
| **Allies killed & wounded** | | | | | |
| Prussians | | 16,033 | 16,054 | 15,472 | 16,000 |
| Russians | | 22,605 | 22,605 | 19,891 | 17,000 |
| Austrians | | 14,958 | 14,960 | 10,361 | 7,000 |
| Swedes | | 178 | 215 | 400 | 400 |
| | | | | | |
| Total Allies killed & wounded | 54,000 | 53,774 | 53,834 | 46,124 | 40,400 |
| Allies captured | | | | 3,817 | 3,800 |
| Total Allied losses | | | | 49,941 | 44,200 |
| | | | | | |
| Total in Nafziger's narative | | | | 46,804 | |

Losses for the battle are uncertain, particularly so for the French. A reasonable way of estimating them could be to take the average of the sources used but that approach is unsound because of the duplication of original sources. This author's preference is to take Petre's figures and add the losses of Liebertwolkwitz (French: 1,500 killed and wounded, 1,000 captured. Allies: 2,500 killed and wounded, 500 captured).

Note 1: Chandler did not reference the source of his data, but it is clear from the figures and his bibliography that he simply used Petre's.[79]

Note 2: Petre's main source was Friederich. He did not provide a bibliography but was probably referring to Rudolf Friederich's Geschichte des Herbsfeldzuges 1813, Berlin 1903, Mittler. He also quoted figures for the Allies given by Plotho, Hofman and Breitzke, which range from 43,000 to 48,000 (average 45,560).[80]

Note 3: Smith's source for the French losses was Dr W. Zelle, 1813 Preussens-Volkerfruhling, Part II, Leipzig (no date), whose methodology was to take the numbers with the French army on 20 October and compare them with the numbers before the battle. This may give a high loss figure because it would include stragglers and those captured during the pursuit. It also includes the losses of 14 October which the other sources do not. For the Allies, Smith used, 'The official Allied lists … from 16–19 October (after the Austrian Krieg-Archiv, Quisthorp and Plotho)'.There is clearly some overlap with Petre's sources. Smith also gives Zelle's [rough] estimate of the Allied losses of 72,000 plus 4,000 prisoners.[81]

Note 4: Nafziger's referenced source for the French losses was A. Martinien, Tableaux par corps et par batailles des Officiers Tués et Blessés pendant les Guerres de l'Empire (1805–1815) (Paris: Editions Militaires Européennes, 1984).These look decidedly low compared with the Allies. If one accepts Zelle's loss figures for the 19th of 6,000 French and 7,000 Allies, Nafziger is reporting 16,000 French and 39,000 Allied killed and wounded for the rest of the battle. By reallocating say 8,000 of the hospitalised troops, this still gives only 24,000 French losses. Nafziger's source for the Allied losses was Plotho, but unfortunately the breakdown given in the narrative is about 3,000 different from his quoted total.[82]

Note 5: Hofschroer appears to have used Nafziger's figures for the French. It is not clear which source he used for the Allies.[83]

East side of city. (Author's collection; city wall from Magister Militum)

# Appendix IV

## French Forces at Dresden at the Time of Leipzig[84]

**Commander in Chief: Maréchal Gouvion St.Cyr**

| | Men | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I Corps: Général de Division Count de Lobau** | | | | |
| 1st Division: Cassagne | | | | |
| French infantry | 2,768 | 7 | | |
| Artillery | 278 | | | 2 |
| 2nd Division: Dumonceau | | | | |
| French inf | 3,091 | 8 | | |
| Artillery | 207 | | | 1 |
| 23rd Division: Teste | | | | |
| French inf | 3,643 | 9 | | |
| Artillery | 150 | | | 1 |
| 20th/21st Light Cavalry Brigades | | | | |
| 9th Chevaulégers-lanciers | 240 | | 2 | |
| 13th Polish Hussars | 434 | | 2 | |
| 16th Polish Uhlans | 709 | | 4 | |
| Reserve artillery & park | | | | |
| Fort artillery | 145 | | | 2 |
| Horse artillery | 172 | | | 3 |
| Train | 394 | | | |
| Sappers & equipage | 500 | | | |
| | 12,731 | 24 | 8 | 9 |
| **Dresden Garrison: Général de Division Durosnel** | | | | |
| Young Guard | 2,703 | 4 | | |
| Westphalian infantry | 3,000 | 5 | | |
| Saxon Guard Grenadiers | 717 | 1 | | |
| Depot troops | 3,446 | | | |
| Artillery & engineers | 2,894 | | | 4 |
| | 12,760 | 10 | - | 4 |

| | Men | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **XIX Corps: St.Cyr** | | | | |
| 42nd Division: Mouton-Duvernet | 6,106 | | | |
| Infantry | | 13 | | |
| Foot artillery | | | | 2 |
| 43rd Division: Claparede | 5,219 | 12 | | |
| Infantry | | | | |
| Foot artillery | | | | 2 |
| 44th Division: Berthezene | 5,443 | | | |
| Infantry | | 12 | | |
| Foot artillery | | | | 2 |
| 45th Division: Razout | 7,100 | | | |
| Infantry | | 12 | | |
| Foot artillery | | | | 1 |
| 10th Light Cavalry Division: Pajol | | | | |
| 2nd Italian Chasseurs a Cheval | 510 | | 4 | |
| 7th Chevaulégers-lanciers | 522 | | 4 | |
| 14th Hussars | 343 | | 4 | |
| Artillery Reserve and Park | 721 | | | |
| Foot artillery | | | | 3 |
| Horse artillery | | | | 2 |
| | 25,964 | 49 | 12 | 10 |

| **Grand Totals** | | Btns | Sqns | Btty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry & artillery | 48,697 | | | |
| Cavalry | 2,758 | | | |
| | 51,455 | 83 | 20 | 23 |

# Endnotes

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## Appendix I - Optional Rules

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## About the Author

**Rohan Saravanamuttu has wargamed for over 40 years and was one of the co-organisers of the Big Battalions wargames group and has designed and arranged many wargames scenarios. After retiring from his career in financial services he acquired an MA (with distinction) in The History of War from the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, which included taking Professor Phil Sabins Conflict Simulation module (wargame design). Rohan was a contributor to the Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Fremont-Barnes, G. (ed), ABC Clio, Santa Barbara, 2006).**

## About the Artists

**Patrice Courcelle was born in 1950 in northern France. He has been a professional illustrator for over 20 years. Entirely self-taught, he has illustrated many books and magazine articles, including many for Helion. Patrice now lives in the town of Waterloo close to the famous battlefield.**

**Maksim Borisov is a Russian artist and illustrator who lives in Moscow. Maksim has been studying the history of military costume for many years. He works for magazines and publishers in Russia, Europe and the United States as both an illustrator and author. He has also taken part in a number of museum projects. In 2012 he was awarded the Public Council under the State Commission for participation in the preparation of the 200th anniversary of Russia's victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.**

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
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



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




# Acknowledgements

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I have drawn heavily on secondary sources and I acknowledge the scholarship of those historians who have done the hard work at the coalface, mining the archives.

It is customary to thank one's spouse for their support and kind forbearance. I would just like to say to my wife, this is what I have being doing all day in the attic!

Cossacks harass Delmas’ baggage train. (Geoff Eyles)